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Editors' Synopsis: The purposes for creating a "private transfer fee"
covenant range from supporting community services to creating afuture
revenue stream for the developer. Traditionally, courts examined these
covenants using the touch and concern standard. The Restatement (Third)
of Property: Servitudes, however, rejects this standard. This Article
discusses this new approach as it relates to private transfer fees. The
author argues that private transfer fee covenants are contrary to public
policy and encourages states to enact legislation limiting the enforcement
of these covenants.
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Assume that ten years ago, Homeland Development Company (Home-
land) acquired a parcel of land that it subdivided into the proposed devel-
opment of Sea View, an upscale, covenant-restricted residential community.
In the recorded declaration for Sea View, Homeland imposed a "recon-
veyance fee" covenant, which was binding for a period of ninety-nine years,
upon each lot. This covenant required the payment to Homeland of a fee
upon each resale of each lot following Homeland's original transfer in an
amount equal to 1% of the price in the relevant resale. The covenant further
provided that if a transfer occurred and the buyer/seller did not pay the fee,
a lien would arise in favor of Homeland to secure the transfer fee.
Now assume that Bob and Nancy Smith, who purchased a home in Sea
View from Homeland nine years ago, recently sold the home to Paul and
Joanne Grant for $500,000. Several related questions now arise: Is Home-
land entitled to collect a $5,000 transfer fee from the Smiths? Will a valid
lien against the home arise if the Smiths do not pay the transfer fee? And
will the obligation to pay this fee upon a future resale bind the Grants-will
420
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this transfer fee covenant "run with the land" to bind successor owners of
lots within Sea View?
Under the traditional formulation for the enforcement of covenants run-
ning with the land, the burden of a covenant did not run to bind a successor
to the covenantor unless both the benefit and the burden of the covenant in
question "touched and concerned" the land.' The transfer fee covenant de-
scribed above is an affirmative covenant to pay money, and while the en-
forcement of such covenants has a somewhat checkered history, both the
benefit and the burden of an affirmative covenant to pay money can touch
and concern land. 2 The classic example in modern common interest devel-
opment is the lot assessment covenant, which imposes an assessment on
each lot (typically payable to a homeowners' association) to fund communi-
ty services and the maintenance of community facilities. Because these
services and amenities benefit community residents directly (for example,
by providing access to pools and parks) or indirectly (for example, by pre-
serving property values through maintenance of desired amenities), both the
burden and benefit of the typical lot assessment covenant touch and concern
land.3
But in the hypothetical Sea View development, the transfer fee is paya-
ble to Homeland, the developer, and not to the owners' association; in other
words, the transfer fee is a private transfer fee. When Homeland attempts to
enforce this fee upon a future transfer, Homeland likely will have sold all
lots within Sea View and will no longer have any interest-other than repu-
tation-in the community. In this context, the benefit of the private transfer
fee covenant is personal to Homeland. In the language of the common law,
the covenant is a benefit "in gross." Under the traditional common law of
real covenants, in cases in which the benefit of a covenant was in gross, the
burden of that covenant did not run to bind successors to the original cove-
nantor.4
I See the original RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 (1944); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK&DALE
A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.15 (3d ed. 2000); see also RICHARD R. POWELL &
PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 675 (1968); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.13 (1952).
2 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.15; JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W.
JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 383-87 (3d ed. 1989); 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Covenants § 29 (2005).
See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1938).
4 See, e.g., Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995); Bremmeyer
Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Caullett v. Stanley
FALL 2010
HeinOnline  -- 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 421 2010-2011
45 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND ESTATE LAW JOURNAL
The publication of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
(Third Restatement) in 2000 has called into question the status of the touch
and concern standard. The Third Restatement purports to abandon the touch
and concern standard, and substitutes a standard under which a covenant is
a servitude (enforceable against successors) unless the covenant is arbitrary,
spiteful, capricious, or creates an unreasonable restraint on alienation or
trade.5 In cases in which a covenant imposes only an indirect restraint on
alienation-as would be the case with a private transfer fee covenant-the
Third Restatement provides that the covenant does not create an unreasona-
ble restraint on alienation unless it "lacks a rational justification."6
Relying in part upon this change in the Third Restatement, a developer
like Homeland will argue that a private transfer fee covenant does not create
an unreasonable restraint on alienation of the affected land. Instead, Home-
land will argue, the affected land will trade freely in the market, albeit at a
slightly reduced price because each buyer will discount its purchase price
slightly to account for the future obligation to pay a transfer fee upon resale.
Further, Homeland might argue, this slight price reduction serves a rational
purpose in that it benefits prospective buyers by lowering their acquisition
cost and some of their carrying costs, such as mortgage interest and real
estate taxes, and thus facilitates home acquisition.7 Under this view, Home-
land will argue, Homeland should be allowed to collect its transfer fee from
the Smiths and enforce the covenant against the Grants and all other succes-
sor owners of the affected parcel.
In the wake of the Third Restatement, developers have begun imposing
private transfer fee covenants at an accelerating pace. As of January 2010,
one marketer of private transfer fee covenants, Austin, Texas-based Free-
hold Capital Partners, working in conjunction with developers and home-
builders, claimed to have imposed ninety-nine-year private transfer fee cov-
enants upon land in forty-three states with a total market value of approx-
imately $600 billion.8 Several developers, including the St. Joe Company
and Lennar Homes, have also used transfer fee covenants to fund nonprofit
organizations that provide services that bear either no relationship or at best
Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); RESTATEMENTOFPROP.
§ 537 (1944).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
6 Id § 3.5(2) ("A servitude that lacks a rational justification is invalid.").
See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
8See Freehold Capital Partners, Learn How Capital Recovery Fee Instruments Can
Help You, http//www.freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/freehold brochure.pdf(last visited
Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Freehold Brochure].
422
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a tangential relationship to affected land within the common interest com-
munity.9
Other real estate industry groups have reacted to this trend with alarm.
For example, brokers fear that a buyer often will not discover the existence
of a private transfer fee covenant until the buyer obtains and reviews a title
insurance commitment well after the signing of the contract. Such late dis-
covery may scuttle or threaten the closing of the sale if the buyer attempts to
use the existence of the covenant as a basis to escape the contract or renego-
tiate a lower price.'0 Title insurers also express concern about the increasing
use of private transfer fee covenants, due to both the uncertainty regarding
the enforceability of such covenants and the risk of missing such covenants
in the search process and thus not excluding them from policy coverage.
Further, because both brokers and title insurers receive compensation, di-
rectly or indirectly, based upon a percentage of the sale price," they under-
standably take a dim view of covenants that may reduce sale prices.
Broker and title industry groups have reacted by going directly to state
legislatures and seeking outright bans on the enforcement of private transfer
fee covenants. These efforts have met with increasing, but not yet universal,
success. Seventeen states have adopted statutory bans on the enforcement of
private transfer fee covenants,12 and the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
Real Property Acts has unanimously recommended that states adopt a statu-
tory prohibition on the enforcement of private transfer fee covenants.13 Con-
sistent with this recommendation, representatives of the American Land
Title Association (ALTA) and the National Association of Realtors (NAR)
have prepared a model statute,14 which appears as an Appendix to this ar-
See Lennar Community Housing Foundation: Launch a Legacy ofHope, httpi/www.
Ichf.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010); St. Joe Community Foundation: A
Foundation for the Future, httpi/www.stjcfcom (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
10 Unless a contract of sale provides otherwise, the seller must provide marketable title
at closing. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 10.12, at 775. The presence of a
private transfer fee covenant constitutes an encumbrance that renders title unmarketable
unless the buyer has expressly agreed to take title subject to the covenant. See id. at 781.
11 The title insurer will calculate its premium based upon the insured amount. The
insured amount does not have to be equivalent to the sale price-a buyer of land could
choose to take less coverage and partially self-insure-but typically the two are equal.
12 See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
13 R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee Covenants, PROB.
& PROP., July/August 2010, at 20, 24.14 MODEL PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANT STATUTE (Am. Land Title Ass'n & Nat'1
Ass'n Realtors 2010), available at http:www.alta.org/advocacy/docs/PrivateTransferFee
ModelLaw.pdf
FALL 20 10
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ticle. These groups hope to obtain widespread introduction and adoption of
similar legislation during the 2010-2011 legislative cycle.
This Article provides a comprehensive evaluation of private transfer fee
covenants and ultimately concludes that state legislation prohibiting the en-
forcement of such covenants is justified. Part I of the article discusses the
basic structure of transfer fee covenants and explains why private transfer
fee covenants are attractive to developers and homebuilders. Part II dis-
cusses the common law touch and concern standard and explores how
courts have used, or not used, the standard in evaluating the enforceability
against successors of various types of contract rights that are somewhat
analogous to transfer fee covenants. Part m addresses whether enforcement
of private transfer fee covenants as servitudes is justified as a matter of
sound land policy under either the common law or the Third Restatement
and concludes that the answer is no. Part IV encourages state legislatures to
enact statutes akin to the ALTA/NAR model statute that prohibit or limit
the enforcement of private transfer fee covenants.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS (PRIVATE
AND OTHERWISE)
By imposing a transfer fee covenant, the developer seeks to obtain a
stream of future revenues by collecting a transfer fee upon all future resales.
The legitimacy of such fee covenants-perceived or real-may vary de-
pending upon the person or organization to whom the fees are payable and
the purposes to which such fees are to apply. This Part outlines three differ-
ent types of transfer fee covenants in current use. The first imposes a fee
payable to an owners' association to fund community services, amenities, or
both. The second imposes a fee payable to a nonprofit organization to fund
the organization's operations or activities, which may or may not be directly
or indirectly related to the ownership of the affected lot. The third imposes a
fee payable to the developer for which the lot owner receives no continuing
services or benefits beyond acquisition of the land. While this article pri-
marily focuses on the third type of fee, the private transfer fee, this Part ad-
dresses the economics of all three to provide the appropriate context for
evaluating whether the law should permit the imposition of private transfer
fee covenants.
A. Transfer Fees Payable to a Homeowners' Association
Within a common interest community, the Homeowners' Association
(HOA) functions in a quasi-governmental role by providing public services
(such as rule enforcement and communication) and by maintaining commu-
nity facilities (such as parks, pools, and recreational facilities) for the bene-
424
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fit of community residents. Just as a municipality must levy taxes and fees
to finance the cost of municipal governance, the HOA must levy compara-
ble charges to finance its functions on behalf of the community. Typically,
HOAs generate funding through covenants that impose a periodic assess-
ment on lot ownership within the defined community, much as municipali-
ties impose ad valorem real estate taxes upon municipal residents.
Municipalities, however, are not limited to ad valorem taxation to raise
revenues and commonly impose transaction-based taxes such as sales taxes,
permit fees, and impact fees to fund municipal governance. Likewise, an
HOA could, if the common interest declaration authorizes it, fund commu-
nity services through transaction-based fees. For example, a declaration
could impose a transfer fee, payable to the HOA, upon all future transfers of
land within the common interest community. Documents establishing coop-
erative housing often impose such a fee, sometimes called a "flip tax." One
might characterize this fee as a community transfer fee; the money it gen-
erates funds services and amenity maintenance within the relevant commu-
nity, thus benefitting the community's residents, at least indirectly.
For example, the HOA for a cooperative typically has the right to ap-
prove prospective purchasers, and many cooperatives exercise that approval
right with great seriousness.16 As a result, the transfer of a cooperative
apartment can involve nontrivial transaction costs for the HOA. The com-
munity could fund these costs from periodic assessments, but the declara-
tion might instead authorize the HOA to fund them by imposing a transfer
fee, thus placing the costs upon the person responsible for them-the
seller-rather than the community as a whole. Alternatively, if the declara-
tion permits, the HOA might impose a transfer fee to fund a portion of its
regular operating costs to avoid increases in periodic assessments-no dif-
ferently than a municipality might increase sales or other transaction taxes
See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1522-23 (1982); see also Albert A. Foer, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of
Private Government, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 379, 384, 389 (1969); Uriel Reichman, Residential
Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 253, 255 (1976); James L.
Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1135, 1153-55 (1998).
16 See, e.g., Max Abelson, 820 Fifth Claims Another Boldface Turn-away; Even Call
from Hizzoner Doesn't Help, THE N.Y. OBSERVER, May 26, 2009 (discussing rejection of
$31 million purchase by developer Jeff Blau and noting co-op board had previously rejected
Ron Perelman, Steve Wynn, and oil heir Fred Koch); see also Michael Decourcy Hinds,
When a Co-op Board Rejects a Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, November 2, 1986; Carol E. Levy, Top
Dozen Reasons for Co-op Board Rejections, THE COOPERATOR (May 2007); Teri Karush
Rogers, Co-ops, Condos, and Secondhand Smoke, N.Y. TIMES, August 6, 2006.
FALL 20 10
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to maintain a lower ad valorem tax rate. Finally, if the declaration permits,
the HOA might choose to levy a transfer fee to promote community stability
and avoid the disruption caused by speculators seeking to purchase and im-
mediately flip units.'7
In theory, this type of transfer fee covenant has a neutral impact on the
value of land within the development. Certainly, if a buyer knows of the
covenant-and thus is aware that she must pay a 1% fee upon a future re-
sale-the buyer should factor this covenant into her offer price. Viewed in
isolation, that knowledge will result in a lower offer price. However, the fee
will also benefit the buyer to the extent that it funds community services
and amenities that may preserve or enhance the value of land. Further, the
fee may enable the HOA to maintain relatively low periodic assessments.
This benefit roughly offsets the obligation inherent in the transfer fee cove-
nant, and thus, the covenant should not reduce the market value of the af-
fected land.
B. The "Quasi-Public" or "Charitable" Transfer Fee Covenant
In some common interest developments, covenants may impose transfer
fees that are payable, not to HOAs, but to nonprofit organizations to fund
the organizations' activities. In some cases, these activities may have a di-
rect and substantial relationship with the development in question. For ex-
ample, suppose that Developer seeks approval to locate a large residential
community called Sunrise on a parcel of land that includes a habitat for en-
dangered birds. As a condition of the approval, local municipal planners
require Developer to set aside 25% of the parcel in its undeveloped condi-
tion to minimize the development's environmental impact. The Developer
creates the Sunrise Community Foundation (SCF), a nonprofit organization
to which Developer will convey a conservation easement over the land sub-
ject to the set-aside. SCF will manage the land subject to the conservation
easement and carry out environmental education and awareness programs
within the local area. Rather than funding SCF's operation through periodic
assessments, Developer instead might impose a covenant that requires sel-
lers to pay a 1% fee to SCF upon all future sales of lots within Sunrise.
While this fee will have an impact upon all buyers within Sunrise, the bene-
fit to the general public (preservation of environmentally sensitive land and
17 Commentators have lamented the role that speculative purchasing has played in
promoting and aggravating the current real estate crisis. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, Should We
Ban or Welcome "Spec" Home Buyers?, 36 J. LEGIS. 1, 17 (2010); Ngai Pindell, Fear and
Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543
(2006).
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environmental education) and to the individual Sunrise residents (potential
enhancement in the value of lots within Sunrise created by proximity and/or
access to the conserved land) arguably may offset this impact.'8
In other circumstances, a developer might impose a transfer fee to sup-
port a public or charitable purpose that is not related-or is at best tangen-
tially related-to the development. One notable, real-world example is the
Lennar Charitable Housing Foundation (LCHF). In many of its develop-
ments, Lennar Homes imposes a transfer fee covenant requiring payment to
LCHF of a small fee-0.05%-upon all future transfers of land within the
development. 19 LCHF does not own or manage any property within any of
the affected developments and does not create or operate low-income hous-
ing. Instead, LCHF provides grants to social service agencies that provide
support for the homeless and those living in substandard housing. 20 Because
the LCHF transfer fee provides for no services or facilities benefitting own-
ers within any development, one expects such a covenant to have only a
negative impact upon the value of the affected lots. One might nevertheless
defend the LCHF covenant as justified based upon its general charitable
purpose and the fact that its small fee only has a de minimis effect on the
land's value.2 1
18 Under current law, the SCF transfer fee covenant is likely enforceable, at least to the
extent the underlying conservation easement is enforceable. Certainly, if an HOA owns and
manages the set-aside land directly as a common element, the HOA could impose assessment
or transfer fee covenants to fund the maintenance and preservation of that land. See supra
note 3. Because the creation of SCF and the conservation easement facilitates the
preservation of the set-aside land, a court likely will conclude that the transfer fee covenant
does touch and concern all land within Sunrise-both the set-aside land subject to the
conservation easement and each lot within Sunrise, the value of which could benefit from
proximity to the conservation area. Likewise, under the Third Restatement, a court likely will
enforce the SCF transfer fee covenant because a "rational justification" supports it. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 illus. 7 (2000) (rational justification
supports a 1% transfer fee covenant to finance foundation to manage environmentally
sensitive land and carry out environmental education programs).
See Lennar Community Housing Foundation, Homeowner Info, LCHF.ORG,
http//lchf.org/homeowner-info.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
See Lennar Community Housing Foundation, Supported Charities, LCHF.ORG,
http /lchf.org/supported-charities.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
21 The LCHF transfer fee is only0.05%, or $150, on the sale of a $300,000 home. Fees
supporting charitable foundations, however, could be larger in size, and the largerthe fee, the
greater an impact it will have upon the value and alienability of the affected land.
Nevertheless, courts frequently have upheld even substantial restraints on alienation where
the conveyances subject to the restraints advanced public purposes, charitable purposes, or
both. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of L.A., 168 P. 1047 (Cal. 1917) (upholding defeasance in
deed to city requiring use of land as a dam); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. New Canaan
FALL 20 10
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C. The Purely Private Transfer Fee Covenant
This covenant involves transfer fees that are payable to a private par-
ty-most commonly, a developer-and bear no relationship to the devel-
opment or the affected residents other than the imposition and collection of
the fee itself. The example in the introduction best reflects this type of cov-
enant. In that example, no fee arises on the original sale from Homeland to
the Smiths. However, when the Smiths later sell their home to the Grants
for $500,000, the covenant, if enforceable, obligates the Smiths to pay
Homeland a $5,000 fee. Likewise, if ten years later, the Grants resell the
home to the Clintons for $600,000, the covenant will obligate the Grants to
pay Homeland another transfer fee in the amount of $6,000.
The private transfer fee covenant should reduce the value of the affected
land relative to comparable land not subject to such a covenant. If the
Smiths are aware of the covenant, they should account for the future trans-
fer fee obligation by reducing their offer price to Homeland. Further, be-
cause the fee does not fund services or maintenance of any amenities within
Sea View, the Smiths receive no corresponding benefit that will offset this
future transfer fee obligation. Thus, imposing the covenant will reduce the
amount Homeland will receive from the sale of the lot.22
Why, then, would Homeland impose the covenant? Presumably because
Homeland expects to make up the lost revenue-and perhaps more-in col-
lecting future transfer fees. Assuming the typical house is sold every seven
years,23 if Homeland imposes a transfer fee covenant upon all 500 lots with-
Historical Soc'y, 54 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1947) (upholding defeasance restriction in deed
benefitting New Canaan Library Association); Dunne v. Minsor, 143 N.E. 842 (Ill. 1924)
(upholding defeasance restriction in deed to church for use as residence for local priest).
Under this approach, a court might enforce a charitable transfer fee as a reasonable restraint
by implicitly or explicitly concluding that the covenant furthers a public or charitable benefit
that outweighs the burden on the affected land.
22 See Letter from J.B. Alderman, CEO, Freehold Capital Partners, to Alfred M.
Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 6-8 (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http//www.flifa.gov/webfiles/19319/2546_FreeholdCapitalPartners.pdf.
23 This number is frequently cited, but its accuracy is unclear. See, e.g., Walter R.
DeRieux, John D. Benjamin & Norman G. Miller, Estimating User Costs and Rates of
Return for Single-Family Residential Real Estate, 8 J. REAL EST. PRAC. & EDUC. 1, 1 (2005).
According to the National Association of Realtors' 2008 Profile ofHome Buyers and Sellers,
sellers of detached single-family homes during 2008 had owned their home for a median of
seven years, while more than four in ten condominium sellers had owned their units for only
three years or less. NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS AND SELLERS 9
(2008). This data was based only on surveys of sellers, however, soit most likely understates
the average holding period for all homes.
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in the Sea View community, Homeland expects the covenant to produce
approximately 7,000 transfer fees over the ninety-nine-year period of the
covenant.24 In this respect, the present value of the private transfer fee cov-
enant's revenue stream could be as high as 4-5% of the improved value of
the affected land.25 By contrast, because the Smiths will only be liable for
payment of the first transfer fee, the Smiths may only discount their offer
26price by 1-2%, which is the perceived impact of the fee on their finances.
If so, the transfer fee covenant provides Homeland with a means to increase
its return on the Sea View development. 27 This is especially true if Home-
land has an effective mechanism to sell the transfer fee covenant rights im-
mediately, such as by pooling together transfer fee rights and selling them
in a private placement or issuing and selling securities backed by the trans-
fer fee rights.28 Further, Homeland may use the presence of the transfer fee
covenant as a positive in its marketing efforts-telling prospective buyers
that the covenant enables them to obtain the land at a discount relative to
similar land that is not subject to such a covenant, thus lowering their acqui-
sition cost and potentially some transaction and carrying costs.29
24 If each lot sells every seven years, each lot will be transferred approximately fourteen
times in the ninety-nine-year period of the covenant. Multiplying the five hundred lots bythe
fourteen transfers per lot gives a total of seven thousand transfers.
25 An earlier version of Freehold Capital Partners' promotional brochure stated, "Recent
valuations have indicated that 5% of the final improved value of the property is a reasonable
initial assumption for most developments." This assertion no longer appears, however, in the
current Freehold Brochure.
26 The Freehold Brochure provides a hypothetical example that suggests a home subject
to a 1% transfer fee covenant will sell for 2% less than a comparable unrestricted home. See
Freehold Brochure, supra note 8, at 3.
27 Theoretically, if a knowledgeable buyer appreciates that the future stream of transfer
fees has a present value of 5% of the unrestricted value of the land, the knowledgeable buyer
will demand a discount closer to that 5% expected value. As discussed in Part III, however,
the typical residential buyer lacks the ability to price the effect of a transfer fee covenant
with accuracy.
28 In its brochure, Freehold Capital Partners suggests that it actively works with
developers to identify ways to monetize the developer's transfer fee stream through "hedge
funds, pension funds and similar institutions as well as the public markets." Freehold
Brochure, supra note 8, at 4.
29 See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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II. PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS AND THE TOUCH AND
CONCERN STANDARD
A. The Touch and Concern Standard and Its Parameters
Under traditional common law rules, for a covenant to run with the land
and bind successors as a "real covenant" (enforceable in an action at law for
damages) or an "equitable servitude" (enforceable in equity through injunc-
tive relief), the covenant had to touch and concern land. The touch and con-
cern standard traces its origins to Spencer's Case,30 in which a lessee had
agreed for himself and his assigns to build a brick wall upon the demised
premises, but the King's Bench refused to enforce the covenant against the
lessee's assignee:
But although the covenant be for him and his assigns, yet if
the thing to be done be merely collateral to the land, and
doth not touch or concern the thing demised in any sort,
there the assignee shall not be charged. As if the lessee
covenants for him and his assigns to build a house upon the
land of the lessor which is no parcel of the demise, or to
pay any collateral sum to the lessor, or to a stranger, it
shall not bind the assignee, because it is merely collateral,
and in no manner touches or concerns the thing that was
demised, or that is assigned over; and therefore in such
case the assignee of the thing demised cannot be charged
with it, no more than any other stranger.3 1
Over time, courts have used the term touch and concern as a label to
identify covenants that are so related to land ownership that sound policy
justifies their enforcement against successor owners of the affected land.
3077 Eng. Rep. 72 (1582).
31 Id. at 74. At first blush, one might view a covenant to build an improvement upon
certain land as satisfying the touch and concern standard. See, e.g., STOEBUCK & WHITMAN,
supra note 1, § 8.15, at 475. Spencer's Case, however, distinguished between a covenant that
extends to a thing "in being" at the time the covenant is made (e.g., a covenant to repair an
already constructed building) and one that relates to a thing not in being at that time (e.g., a
covenant to build on otherwise undeveloped land). See 77 Eng. Rep. at 74. The court in
Spencer's Case held that the former was binding against an assignee but not the latter. See id.
32 See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 383 ("The purpose of [the touch and
concern] requirement is said to be to prevent the serious restraint on alienability of land that
might occur if landowners could impose upon subsequent owners obligations totally
unrelated to the land of either party."); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IoWA L. REv. 615, 646-49
(1985); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
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Significantly, in interpreting this standard, courts traditionally required the
party seeking to enforce a covenant against a successor to establish that both
ends of the covenant-both the benefit and the burden of the covenant-
touched and concerned land.33
For a typical restrictive covenant imposed in common interest develop-
ment-for example, a covenant restricting land's use to single-family resi-
dential use only-the touch and concern requirement poses no analytical
difficulty. The touch and concern requirement became problematic for
courts as they evaluated affirmative covenants-ones that obligate the own-
ers of affected parcels to pay money or perform some service during their
periods of ownership. Traditionally, English courts refused to enforce the
burden of an affirmative covenant against a successor to ownership of the
burdened land, at least outside the context of leases.M In this way, English
law prevented fee simple landowners from re-creating modern versions of
feudal obligations35 and thereby restricting the marketability of land.36 In-
fluential early American decisions incorporated this prohibition on affirma-
tive burdens running with land-most notably the New York Court of
Appeals in Miller v. Clary,37 which held that a covenant by the owner of a
mill to provide power to a neighboring parcel did not run with the land to
bind the successor owner of the land on which the mill was located.
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L REV. 1,
84-88.
33 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 (1944); CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 384
(3d ed. 1989); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.15, at 475.
See 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 163-65 (3ded. 1924); R.E.
MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 751-53 (3d ed. 1966).
See Reichman, supra note 15, at 145-46; Sterk, supra note 32, at 645 n. 118,646-49.
36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. k (2000).
Affirmative burdens create greater risks than negative burdens
because performance requires resources in addition to those needed to
acquire the burdened property, and liability for failure to perform usually
persists until the burdened property is transferred to another. Purchasers
of property burdened by a negative servitude ordinarily risk only the
assets invested in the property; purchasers of property burdened by an
affirmative servitude risk their other assets as well.
Id.
103 N.E. 1114 (N.Y. 1913); see also Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816,
820 (N.Y. 1976) ("The affirmative covenant is disfavored in the law because of the fear that
this type of obligation imposes an 'undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in
perpetuity."' (quoting Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 835 (N.Y.
1959))).
FALL 2010
HeinOnline  -- 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 431 2010-2011
45 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND ESTATE LAW JOURNAL
Over time, courts began to see that a blanket prohibition on affirmative
covenants would limit common interest development patterns unduly.
Common interest development typically includes services and facilities
available to all owners within the development, such as recreational facili-
ties (for example, pools and parks) and community management (for exam-
ple, enforcement of community land use restrictions through an owners'
association). Buyers may value these services and facilities, but providing
them involves substantial expense, both in hard development (for example,
the costs of building a pool) and ongoing maintenance (for example, the
costs of repairing and operating the pool). Common interest development
typically finances the latter costs through covenants to pay a periodic as-
sessment to the HOA. Such an affirmative assessment covenant does not
unreasonably burden the alienability of assessed lots. 38 By ensuring the
HOA can generate the funds needed to maintain the common amenities-
and thereby preserve the resale value of each lot-the assessment covenant
ostensibly benefits the owner of each affected lot. For this reason, American
courts gradually adapted the traditional prohibition against affirmative cov-
enants and concluded that an affirmative covenant for lot assessments with-
in a common interest development does touch and concern land.39
Some covenants, however, create payment obligations that provide in
gross benefits to the covenantee-the covenantee neither owns an estate in
any land benefitted by the performance of the covenant nor acts on behalf of
such an owner. In this situation, courts often retained the traditional disfavor
of affirmative covenants and held that where the benefit of a covenant was
in gross, the burden of the covenant would not run to bind a successor to the
original covenantor.4 Section 537 of the original Restatement of Property
adopted this view.4 1
38 See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.
2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S.W. 2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
41 Section 537 provides the following:
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has
made a promise can be bound as promisors only if (a) the performance of the
promise will benefit the promisee or other beneficiary of the promise in the
physical use or enjoyment of the land possessed by him, or (b) the
consummation of the transaction of which the promise is a part will operate to
benefit and is for the benefit of the promisor in the physical use or enjoymentof
land possessed by him, and the burden on the land of the promisor bears a
reasonable relation to the benefit received by the person benefited.
RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 (1944).
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The if-the-benefit-is-in-gross-the-burden-won't-run rule operated as a
particularized, if perhaps overbroad, application of the general rule against
unreasonable restraints on alienation. Because the burden of a covenant had
the potential to limit the alienability of the affected land, enforcement of a
covenant had to benefit the affected land or some neighboring parcel so as
not to decrease the overall utility of land. Courts traditionally applied this
principle in prophylactic fashion: whether a covenant that created personal
benefits was actually a substantial burden on the alienability of the land was
irrelevant.42 If the covenant created a benefit personal to the covenantee, the
burden of that covenant would not bind successors even if the actual burden
on alienability was de minimis.4 3 In this respect, the rationale for the pro-
phylactic touch and concern rule was similar to the rationale of the tradi-
tional what-might-happen Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) test."
B. The Touch and Concern Standard as Applied to Contract and Payment
Rights
As discussed in Part I.C, the Third Restatement purports to abandon
the touch and concern standard, calling into question the if-the-benefit-is-in-
gross-the-burden-won't-run rule. To provide context for why the Third Re-
statement took this approach, this Subpart reviews how, or in some cases,
whether, courts applied the traditional touch and concern standard to con-
tract rights that are analytically similar to private transfer fee covenants.
Theoretically, the traditional rule should discourage landowners from
imposing covenants that create only personal benefits. But in practice, this
in terrorem effect is incomplete. Some landowners may impose such
42 See, e.g., CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 384 (noting that the appeal of the
both-ends-must-touch-and-concern rule "may have been that it spared courts the difficult
task of evaluating the worth of an infinite variety of benefits and interests that imaginative
drafters might seek to advance through covenants burdening land.").
43 See, e.g., Montgomery, 22 S.W.2d at 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (refusing to enforce
gasoline purchase requirements contract against successor even though agreement was by its
terms enforceable against a successor for only one year); Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v.
McKenna, 721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to enforce covenant to fill the
affected land against successor owner even though covenant by its terms had onlya five-year
term).
4Under the what-might-happen test, it did not matter that a particular contingent
interest was unlikely to vest remotely; the law's pro-alienability policy justified a
prophylactic rule that any interest that could vest too remotely was void from the beginning
even if the actual risk of remote vesting was trivial. See, e.g., Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep.
1186 (1787) (invalidating executory interest in the daughters of Elizabeth Jee because Jee
was presumed capable of having additional children, although Jee was 70 years old at the
time of the conveyance).
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agreements in ignorance of the rules restricting the enforceability of cov-
enants in gross. Furthermore, at the margin, courts have strugled to deter-
mine whether a particular covenant actually benefits land. As a result,
courts have frequently addressed the extent to which an agreement can bind
title to land if the agreement does not provide a direct benefit to the use and
enjoyment of land.46 This Article discusses the provisions of the Third Re-
statement and evaluates whether and to what extent a private transfer fee
covenant should be enforceable.
1. Option Contracts
Sometimes, a grantor of land will convey fee simple title subject to an
option permitting the grantor/optionee to reacquire that title in the future.
Theoretically, one could characterize an option to purchase land as a cov-
enant and evaluate whether it should run with title to the land to bind a suc-
cessor to the granteeloptionor. Under this approach, one could argue that the
benefit of an option contract is personal to the optionee-at least if the op-
tionee has no present possessory interest in the optioned land or surrounding
land. If a court applies the traditional touch and concern principle, one
might argue that the burden of the option-the obligation to convey title
upon exercise-should not bind a successor. This argument, however,
seems problematic: the benefit of the option contract is nominally land-
related because the benefit enables the optionee to acquire title to the land.
Furthermore, the option may have influenced the price at which the optionor
acquired the land in the first instance, so nonenforcement could significant-
ly disrupt the optionee's expectations.
In reality, courts have chosen not to treat option contracts under the law
of covenants and have instead treated an optionee as the holder of an equi-
table future interest in the optioned land. As a result, courts have enforced
options unless they violated RAP47 or created an unreasonable restraint on
alienation-if the option price would unreasonably deter transfer or devel-
opment of the land.48 This approach seems analytically preferable; if the
As Justice Lehman noted in Neponsit, "[W]hether a particular covenant is sufficiently
connected with the use of land to run with the land, must be in many cases a question of
degree." Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 796.
See id.
See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996);
Cent. Del. Cnty. Auth. v. Greyhound Corp., 588 A.2d 485 (Pa. 1991). But see Stenke v.
Masland Dev. Co., Inc., 394 N.W.2d 418 (Mich. App. 1986) (fixed-price purchase option is
not subject to RAP because it is not an estate or future interest in land).
See, e.g., Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980) (repurchase option of
unlimited duration was unreasonable restraint on alienation where option price equaled
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parties factored the option into the sale price and the option is recorded to
give notice to subsequent purchasers, no good reason exists to frustrate the
optionee's bargain if the option does not seriously affect the land's aliena-
bility or discourage its development. The impact on alienability and devel-
opment will depend upon the option price. If the agreement requires the op-
tionee to pay market value at the time of exercise, the option should not
seriously affect the land's alienability or discourage its development. By
contrast, a fixed-price option could discourage the owner from improving or
developing the land, depending upon the option's price and duration. But
many courts that have struck down fixed-price options concluded that the
option violated RAP-itself traditionally a prophylactic rule-without
reaching the more nuanced conclusion that the option was an unreasonable
49restraint on alienation.
2. Rights of First Refusal
The right of first refusal (ROFR) is a close relation to the option, giving
its holder, the preemptionee, the right to acquire title only if the owner of
the affected land, the preemptioner, contracts to sell it. One might character-
ize a ROFR as a type of covenant, the benefit of which is purely personal to
the preemptionee, and conclude that the burden of the ROFR will not run
with title to the land. A few decisions have taken this approach.50 One par-
ticularly noteworthy decision is Feider v. Feider,5' in which the Washington
Court of Appeals held that a ROFR was a personal contract and did not run
with the land to bind a successor to the preemptioner:
Neither do we find evidence the agreement "touches
and concerns" land. To satisfy this requirement, the
agreement must have rendered less valuable [the
preemptioner's] legal interest in his land and rendered
amount paid plus cost of permanent improvement, without accounting for inflation or
appreciation in land's value).
49 See, e.g., Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d 799; Cent. Del. Cnty. Auth., 588 A.2d 485.
50 See, e.g., In re Fleishman, 138 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); Ricketson v.
Bankers First Say. Bank, 503 S.E.2d 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Nichols v. Lake Toxaway
Co., Inc., 390 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. App. 1990); Levy v. Blue Ridge Constr. Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d
314 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Feider v. Feider, 699 P.2d 801, 803-04 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
699 P.2d 801 (1985). Feider involved a parcel of land originally held in co-
ownership by the Feider siblings and partitioned in kind. See id. at 802. Francis Feider
received fee ownership of this parcel in partition and granted a ROFR to his brother Andrew,
the owner of the adjacent parcel. Twenty-nine years later Francis sold his parcel following
Andrew's death but without giving notice to Andrew's heirs, who later sued for specific
performance of the ROFR. See id.
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more valuable the legal interest of [the preemptionee] in
his land.... [N]o interest in land is created b a right of
first refusal; only personal rights are affected.
From a policy perspective, the result in Feider appears unsatisfactory.
The ROFR did not obligate the preemptioner to sell at a price he was not
willing to accept. Because the preemptioner could command a market price,
he had no disincentive to improve or develop the land; thus, the court had
no good reason to refuse to enforce the ROFR.
Some courts have enforced ROFRs by stretching to conclude that the
ROFR is a covenant that touches and concerns land.53 Most courts, howev-
er, have avoided the touch and concern thicket by evaluating ROFRs like
options and treating them as a type of contingent interest subject to analysis
under RAP and the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation. 54 Be-
cause of their minimal impact upon alienability, nearly all classic ROFRs
will satisfy the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation. 5 But what
if the ROFR is not time limited as to its exercise? One might argue that be-
cause an ROFR poses no practical impediment to alienability, RAP should
not apply, and some courts have agreed.5 6 Nevertheless, other courts contin-
ue to aptly RAP in prophylactic fashion to invalidate non-time-limited
ROFRs. Others imply a reasonable time during which the preemptionee
must exercise an ROFR for the right to satisfy RAP. 8
52 Feider, 699 P.2d at 804.
53 See, e.g., Drayson v. Wolff, 661 N.E.2d 486, 497 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Such a
conclusion appears particularly justified if the preemptionee also owns adjoining land, as
was the case in Feider. In such situations, exercise allows the preemptionee to consolidate
ownership of the parcels, potentially enhancing their use value or development potential.
Metro. Transp. Co. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1986).
See, e.g., Hare v. McClellan, 662 A.2d 1242 (Conn. 1995); Metro. Transp. Co., 492
N.E.2d at 384.
56 See, e.g., Cambridge Co. v. E. Slope Inv. Corp., 700 P.2d 537,541 (Colo. 1985); JLI
Assocs., Inc. v. Persiani, 550 A.2d 650,654 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988); Hinson v. Roberts, 349
S.E.2d 454,456 (Ga. 1986); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Idaho 1983); Metro. Transp. Co., 492 N.E.2d at 385; cf Gartley v.
Ricketts, 760 P.2d 143, 145 (N.M. 1988) (holding ROFR creates no future interest in
property and thus is not subject to RAP).
See Hensley-O'Neal v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 297 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Mo. App. 2009);
Low v. Spellman, 629 A.2d 57, 58 (Me. 1998); Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 860 A.2d 886, 895
(Md. App. 2004).
58 See, e.g., Mazzeo v. Kartman, 560 A.2d 733 (N.J. Super Ct. 1989); Maupin v. Dunn,
678 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
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3. Covenants Not to Compete
One of the best examples of the touch and concern standard's lack of
clarity involves judicial treatment of noncompetition covenants. Often, a
grantor will convey fee title or a leasehold estate subject to a covenant that
neither the grantee/lessee nor its successors may use the premises to com-
pete with a business activity operated by the grantor/lessor on adjacent or
nearby land. Early American courts often refused to enforce such arrange-
ments against successors, holding that noncompetition covenants did not
touch and concern land and benefitted only the business interests of the
grantor. For example, in Norcross v. James,59 an 1885 Massachusetts
Supreme Court case, the grantor, who operated quarries on adjacent lands,
deeded land subject to a covenant that purported to prohibit the grantee
from operating a quarry. The court held that the covenant did not touch and
concern the land and did not bind the grantee's successor because the cov-
enant "[did] not make the use or occupation of it [the grantor's land] more
convenient."6 Instead, the covenant merely benefitted the grantor's busi-
61
ness by excluding competition.
Over time, decisions such as Norcross received substantial and justifia-
ble criticism. While the covenant in Norcross certainly protected the gran-
tor's quarrying business, the grantor had made a substantial investment in
developing the surrounding lands as a quarry, and the restriction, if enforce-
able, would have enhanced the value of that investment. For this reason,
modern decisions hold that noncompetition covenants can touch and con-
cern land, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court itself recognized in overrul-
ing Norcross in 1979.62 Today courts generally enforce noncompetition
covenants unless they find a particular covenant constitutes an unreasonable
restraint on trade or competition.63
4. Tying Arrangements
Suppose that A sells Blueacre to B and delivers a deed that obligates B
and B's heirs, successors, and assigns to use A's lawn maintenance services.
59 2 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1885).
See id. at 949.
61 See id
62 See Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979).
63 Doo v. Packwood, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477,480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Natural Prod. Co. v.
Dolese& Shepard Co., 140 N.E. 840, 841 (Ill. 1923); Whitinsville Plaza, 390N.E.2d at 243;
Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 295 (N.J. 1990); Silverstein v.
Shell Oil Co., 337 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (App. Div. 1972); Colby v. McLaughlin, 310P.2d 527,
529 (Wash. 1957).
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If this agreement is supported by consideration, A seemingly could enforce
this agreement against B under contract law. But should the covenant run
with title to bind B's successor?
Traditionally, most courts applied the touch and concern principle to
strike down such tying arrangements. A classic example is Caullett v. Stan-
ley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., in which a developer (Stilwell) sold an undevel-
oped, one-acre lot to Caullett for $4,000 by a deed under which Stilwell "re-
serve[d] the right to build or construct the original dwelling or building on
said premises."65 The covenant, by its terms, was expressly binding upon
successors. When Caullett later challenged the covenant's enforceability by
claiming the covenant was impermissibly vague and did not touch and con-
cern land, the trial court quieted title in favor of Caullett, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed and characterized the covenant as too obscure to
justify its enforcement.66 The court also concluded that even if the covenant
was sufficiently definite, it did not touch and concern land:
This is at best a personal arrangement between the two
parties, designed to insure defendant a profit on the
erection of a dwelling in return, allegedly, for a
comparatively low sales price on the land. While there is
nothing in our law precluding such an arrangement, as a
contract inter partes, this form of contract, contemplating a
single personal service upon the property, does not affect
the title....
Generally prerequisite to a conclusion that a covenant
runs with the land at law is a finding that both burdened
and benefited properties exist and were intended to be so
affected by the contracting parties . . . [When] the burden
is placed upon the land, and the benefit is personal to one
of the parties and does not extend to his or other lands, the
burden is generally held not to run with the land at law.
The policy is strong against hindering the alienability of
one property where no corresponding enhancement accrues
to surrounding lands.67
170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
Id at 53.
See id. at 54.
67 Id at 55-56 (citations omitted).
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The Caullett court acknowledged that this rule had been subject to criti-
cism, and the criticism is justified, at least as applied to the facts in Caul-
lett.68 While being unable to bid his construction contract would have dis-
advantaged Caullett by requiring him to pay a noncompetitive price, he
apparently obtained the lot at a discount from its otherwise unrestricted
price. In addition, enforcing the covenant would not have impacted the
alienability of the land. Because the covenant was recorded, anyone buying
the undeveloped lot from Caullett could have discovered the tying arrange-
ment and lowered the offer price accordingly. Further, the covenant's poten-
tial impact on alienability was temporary as it only provided Stilwell the
right to build the first home on the lot. Once Stilwell constructed that first
home, the covenant no longer would have affected title to the land or the
price in later sales. 69 Under those circumstances, applying the touch or con-
cern rule to defeat the covenant is the proverbial equivalent of "launch[ing]
a missile to kill a mouse."70
Recognizing the problems of taking a prophylactic approach, some
courts have used equitable discretion to enforce comparable tying arrange-
ments against successors. One notable example is Chock Full of Power
Gasoline Corp. v. Bill WolfPetroleum Corp., in which Linmont Properties
(Linmont) purchased a lot on which Newman, Nager, and Wolf (NN&W)
had been operating an Amoco station. In conjunction with the sale, which
was partially financed by NN&W, Linmont and NN&W agreed that Lin-
mont and its successors would buy gasoline from NN&W or its designee for
a period of ten years. 72 Six years later, Chock Full bought the land from
Linmont and refused to comply with the requirements contract. 3 The trial
court held that the agreement did not run with the land, but the appellate
division reversed and noted that Chock Full purchased the premises "with
full knowledge of its terms, including the covenant binding all subsequent
68 See id at 56.6 9 This assumes that subsequent buyers have some way to determine that Stilwell
actually built the home-satisfying the covenant-as uncertainty about the provenance of the
home could render the title unmarketable. Presumably, the owner of the land could have
obtained and recorded some acknowledgment from Stilwell that the covenant had been
performed.
70 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
71344 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 1973).
See id at 31.
73See id
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owners." 74 Concluding that the requirements contract was of a reasonable
duration, the majority held the covenant to be "an equitable obligation
which is enforceable against Chock Full as a taker with actual notice." 75
While some courts have enforced comparable arrangements,76 many
others have refused to do so. One particularly egregious example is Mont-
gomery v. Creager,77 in which the court refused to enforce a gasoline pur-
chase requirements contract against a successor even though the contract,
by its terms, could have run against the successor for no more than one year.
Thus, it only could have had a de minimis impact upon the land's alienabili-
ty.78 Likewise, in Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna 7 9 Parks entered
into an agreement that granted Bremmeyer Excavating (Bremmeyer) the
exclusive right to provide fill services upon certain land belonging to Parks
for a period of five years. Although the agreement, with its five-year term,
would have only nominally impacted the land's alienability, the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the benefit of the covenant was personal to
Bremmeyer and, thus, the burden of the covenant did not bind Parks's suc-
cessor.so
5. Agreements to Retain Development Control
Suppose that X wants to sell a parcel of land but retain some or all of
the economic benefit associated with the land's future development. X can
7 4 Id. The court also noted that Chock Full had originally attempted to negotiate a
modification or termination of the agreement. See id.
Id The decision in Chock Full of Power was 3-2, with the dissenting judges
objecting that the requirements contract did not "touch or concern the land in any physical
sense" and was "manifestly personal to plaintiffs' business." Id at 32-33 (Brennan &
Benjamin, JJ., dissenting).
See, e.g., Trosper v. Shoemaker, 227 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1949) (enforcing restrictive
covenant); Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's AutoMart, Inc., 45 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. 1951)
(enforcing restrictive covenant).
22 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
78 See id. at 466 ("The agreement . . . is certainly not such as attaches to the property,
but is urely personal between Creager and Montgomery.").
721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
80 See id. at 568-69.
This contract . . . does not impose a benefit or a burden on the
property at all. It imposes a burden on Parks personally and then only
with respect to his choice of a contractor to provide fill and site
improvements. . . . "Intent is not enough to make a running covenant out
of one which is by its nature personal."
Id. at 568-69 (quoting Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Investors Co., 691 P.2d
970, 972 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984))).
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do this by retaining an option or first refusal right as discussed earlier in
Part 1 1 .8 But can X do this merely by creating a covenant that runs with the
land and requires X's approval for future development?
A classic example is Garland v. Rosenshein.82 Rosenshein bought a
parcel of land in Peabody, Massachusetts in 1986 for $775,000. Hoping to
develop this parcel together with an adjoining parcel, Rosenshein negotiated
to buy the adjoining parcel. Unable to acquire that parcel, Rosenshein sold
his lot in June 1987 to North Shore Auto Brokers, Inc. (North Shore) for
$1.25 million subject to a covenant that purported to prohibit North Shore
and its successors from developing the property in conjunction with the ad-
joining parcel without Rosenshein's consent. 3 Several years later, North
Shore's successors, Garland and Pantazelos, reached a development agree-
ment with the owner of the adjoining parcel and sued Rosenshein seeking a
declaration that the covenant was unenforceable under a state statute provid-
ing that a covenant is enforceable only if it "is at the time of the proceeding
of actual and substantial benefit to a person claiming rights of enforce-
ment."8" The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judg-
ment that the covenant did not bind Garland and Pantazelos and held the
covenant provided no actual and substantial benefit:
Section 30 must refer to an "actual and substantial
benefit" to the holder of a purported right of enforcement
beyond the "hold-up price" for releasing the restriction. To
be "actual," the benefit must come from the existence and
enforceability of the restriction, rather than from the price
of releasing the restriction.85
The court also held that the covenant was not enforceable under com-
mon law principles, noting that Rosenshein "admittedly owns no land which
is benefited by the restriction" and recognizing that "where the benefit is
personal, the burden of the covenant does not run with the land."86
Garland reflects the traditional application of the touch and concern
principle. But is the result sound? Rosenshein clearly believed that a "de-
velopment premium" was associated with this parcel-that it would be
worth more if it could be developed in conjunction with the adjacent parcel
than if developed alone. Rosenshein wanted to capture some or all of this
81 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
82 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995).
83 See id at 757.
8 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 30 (2003); see Garland, 649 N.E.2d at 757.
85 Garland, 649 N.E.2d at 758.
86 Id
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development premium for himself, but could not reach an agreement with
the adjacent owner. He thus tried to capture this benefit by imposing a re-
strictive covenant on the affected parcel. In economic terms, this effort is no
different from Rosenshein retaining a preemptive right to repurchase the
land triggered by its future development in conjunction with the neighbor-
ing parcel. Further, as long as Rosenshein's buyer was aware of this restric-
tion, the buyer could have taken the restriction into account in setting the
offer price for the land. So why not enforce the restriction against a succes-
sor with notice?
One argument is that the restriction constituted an unreasonable re-
straint upon the land's alienability or an unreasonable disincentive to devel-
opment. But that situation certainly does not appear to have occurred in
Garland, at least with respect to the parcel that Rosenshein sold. 87 The cov-
enant did not prevent all development of the land, only its development in
conjunction with the adjacent parcel.88 As a result, the covenant did not nar-
row the market unduly for buyers of Rosenshein's land-presumably, the
covenant would not discourage those willing to develop only on that parcel.
Further, after Rosenshein imposed the covenant, the land promptly sold
twice at progressively increasing prices before being sold at a significantly
reduced price after the FDIC foreclosed on the mortgage.8 9
The other argument is that the restriction only benefitted Garland per-
sonally and was not land-related. 0 But, as explained earlier, one could
make the same argument with regard to a purchase option or a first refusal
right, which usually are land-related only in the sense that, if enforced, they
permit the holder to acquire title. If land-relatedness is the key, then it is
unclear why the law should tolerate repurchase options, appreciation-
sharing agreements, or defeasible estates. Why allow the grantor to retain
some benefit of ownership after conveying away the burdens of ownership?
The answer is that we allow grantors such flexibility to encourage transact-
ing in land, and we view that flexibility and the transactions it produces as
socially useful, at least up to the point at which we can identify external
costs that outweigh the benefits associated with that flexibility. As Garland
87 One might also challenge the covenant as an unreasonable restraint based on its
impact on the value or development of the neighboring parcel, but more information is
necessary to evaluate the covenant's impact in this regard.
88 See Garland, 649 N.E.2d at 757.
89 Rosenhein purchased the property for $775,000 and subsequently sold the property to
North Shore for $1.25 million. North Shore resold the parcel in 1989 for $1.675 million;
three years later, following a foreclosure, Garland and Pantazelos bought the parcel from the
FDIC for $550,000. See id
9See id at 758.
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may indicate, a prophylactic touch and concern rule could overly deter
owners from entering into creative transactions that would not seriously
restrain the alienability of the affected land.
6. Agreements Imposing Fees Upon Future Resales
To conclude Part II's review of how courts have applied the touch and
concern standard, this Subpart discusses the closest analogues to the modem
private transfer fee covenant-quarter sales and profit-sharing agreements.
a. "Quarter Sales"
Suppose that X sells Blueacre to Y, and delivers a deed that provides
that upon all future resales of Blueacre, the seller must pay 10% of the re-
sale price to X. This type of arrangement traditionally has been called a
"quarter sale." 91 One might defend this device as a creative method by
which X can finance a portion of Y s acquisition cost. Rather than loaning Y
a portion of the sale price and taking back a mortgage, X instead might
choose to accept a reduced sale price and retain the right to receive a pay-
ment of 10% of all future resales. Should the law permit X to recover the
10% resale fee upon Y's resale and all future resales by remote purchasers?
Traditionally, the answer was a resounding no. Courts routinely struck
down quarter sale arrangements, particularly if the quarter sale was struc-
tured as a condition-in other words, enforceable by forfeiture upon breach
91 The term quarter sale derives from a particular provision of the durable lease
common in early 19th century New York:
Stephen Van Rensselaer, with the assistance of Alexander Hamilton,
created a "durable lease" that would bind his tenants and their heirs to the
manor in perpetuity. By calling the contract an "incomplete sale," Hamilton had
devised a means to sidestep the issue of feudalism, which had been outlawed in
New York State in 1787. Tenants were required to pay the patroon an annual
rent of ten to twenty bushels of winter wheat per one hundred acres, "four fat
fowl," and a day's labor with a team of horses and wagon. In addition, the
tenant was to pay all taxes and use the land for agricultural purposes only, while
the patroon kept all timber, mineral, and water rights, as well as the right to
exploit those resources. These leases also provided that when a tenant chose to
sell all or part of his farm, [the tenant] was thus required to pay a "quarter sale"
or one-fourth of the sale price to the patroon in order to release the property to
another individual or party. Hence, the patroon kept all the advantages of land
ownership, and the tenant had all of the obligations of land improvement, road
building and taxes. This was not quite the binding to the land of the old
European feudal system, but it was fairly close in actual effect.
Van RensselaerManor Papers: TheAnti-Rent Wars, N.Y. STATE LBRARY, http//www.nysl.
nysed.gov/mssc/vrm/h5antirent.htm (July 15, 2010).
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of thepayment obligation.92 DePeyster v. Michael reflects the classic treat-
ment. In 1785, James Van Rensselaer conveyed a farm parcel of about
one-hundred acres to William P. Snyder in fee and reserved an annual rent
of forty-eight bushels of wheat as well as the right to one-fourth of all sums
arising from all future transfers of the land." The agreement further pro-
vided that the lessee's subsequent transfer would be void if the lessee did
not pay the appropriate sum to the lessor when due, and the lessor reserved
a right to re-enter the premises upon breach of any covenant or condition. 95
In 1844, DePeyster, the successor to Van Rensselaer, brought an action in
ejectment against Michael, the successor to Snyder, alleging that one or
more transfers had occurred without the appropriate quarter payments.96
The trial court ruled that the quarter sale provision was void and instructed
the jury to render a verdict in favor of Michael.97 The Court of Appeals of
New York affirmed the judgment entered upon this verdict.9 8 In sweeping
language, the opinion struck down such percentage arrangements, regard-
less of the size of the percentage:
The ownership of the fee cannot exist in one person while
the ownership of the right of alienation and of its fruits,
exists in a different person....
That this principle was at an early day engrafted upon
the common law and applied to estates in fee . .. is not
founded exclusively on principles of natural law. It rests
also on grounds of great public utility and convenience; in
facilitating the exchange of property; in simplifying its
ownership, and in freeing it from embarrassments, which
92 See DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852); Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb. Ch. 28
(N.Y. 1850), af'id, 6 N.Y. 510 (1852); VI Am. LAW OF REAL PROP. § 26.68, at 512-513
(Casner ed. 1952).
6 N.Y. 467 (1852).
The agreement reserved the following to Van Rensselaer:
[O]ne equal fourth part of all the moneys owing or that might arise by
or from the selling, renting, setting over, assigning, or any how disposing
of the premises leased, or any part or parcel thereof, by the said lessee,
his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and when, and as often,
and every time, the same shall be sold, rented, set over, assigned or
otherwise disposed of.
Id. at 489.
95 See id at 489-90.
9See id at 468.
See id at 470.
98 See id at 509.
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are injurious not only to its possessor, but to the public at
large.
If the continuance of the estate can be made to depend
on the payment of a tenth, or a sixth, or a fourth part of the
value of the land at every sale, it may be made to depend
on the payment of nine-tenths, or the whole of the sale
money. It is impossible on any known principle to say, that
a condition to pay a quarter of the sale money is valid, and
a condition to pay the half or any greater proportion would
be void. If we affirm the validity of a condition to pay a
quarter, we must affirm a condition to pay any greater
amount.9
The DePeyster court justified its prophylactic approach as a matter of
judicial competence and efficiency. A reasonableness approach would
oblige a court to make a nuanced evaluation in every case as to whether a
particular arrangement constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Certainly, a provision imposing a 100% fee would negate the grantee's title
and thus unreasonably restrain alienation of the affected land. By contrast, a
fee of $5 might have a relatively minor practical impact upon the alienabili-
ty of the land or the price at which it will trade. Unfortunately, there is no
certain point at which the size of the fee tips the scales of reasonableness.
As DePeyster suggested, the prophylactic approach allowed courts to avoid
the difficult and arbitrary line drawing that would result under a case-by-
case rule.
Courts also invalidated similar provisions that were not expressly en-
forceable by forfeiture. For example, in Girard v. Myers,' Myers, a real
estate agent, contracted to purchase the Pickering Farm by a contract that
divided the Farm into seven parcels.' 0 ' Myers found investors to finance the
purchase of each parcel and required each investor to sign an agreement that
entitled Myers to 11% of the proceeds of any and all future resales of the
parcel.102 The initial investors in one parcel later sold it to Girard in a trans-
action in which Myers received a commission. Girard later resold the parcel
but refused to pay the stipulated 11% fee to Myers and argued that the fee
imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 0 3 The trial court struck
9 Id at 493-94.
100 694 P.2d 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
101See at 680.
See id at 680-81.
See id at 681.
FALL 2010
HeinOnline  -- 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 445 2010-2011
45 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND ESTATE LAW JOURNAL
down the agreement, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in a
straightforward application of the touch and concern principle:
[T]he restraints imposed upon alienation by the
[agreement] . . . are not reasonable or justified under the
guidelines outlined in the Restatement of Property. Myers
has no interest in the Girard property. The provisions in the
[agreement] imposing restraints on alienation serve no
purpose other than to give Myers further profits on each
resale and further investment opportunities at a bargaining
advantage. This does not meet the requirement that the
restraint be for the purpose of protecting an interest in land
or accomplishing a worthwhile purpose. 04
b. One-time Resale Fees
By contrast, suppose that X sells Blueacre to Y and delivers a deed that
requires Y to pay to X a 10% resale fee, but only upon the first resale by Y,
not upon subsequent resales by remote buyers. The agreement states that the
payment obligation will run with title to Blueacre until the buyer pays it. Y
later sells the land to Z, but Ydoes not pay the 10% fee to X. Should the law
permit X to enforce the covenant against Z or refuse to do so because the
covenant does not touch and concern land?
At first blush, this arrangement appears more benign than the true quar-
ter sale. After all, X could have sold the land to Y for its fair market value of
$200,000, taking payment of $180,000 in cash and a $20,000 purchase
money note and mortgage, with no question about the enforceability of the
note or the mortgage. Why not allow X to sell the land for only $190,000 in
cash and retain the right to 10% of the sale price upon resale by Y, as well as
the risk that Y never resells the land? As between X and Y, little reason ex-
ists not to enforce this bargain. Likewise, as long as Yhas recorded the cov-
enant, one might argue that any remote buyer can either (1) obtain assur-
ance of the covenant's prior performance or (2) discount its offer price to
account for the payment obligation. Finally, because of the one-time nature
of the fee covenant, it only temporarily effects alienability and the market
value of the land; once the buyer gays the fee, the land will trade freely at
its unrestricted fair market value. Accordingly, under a case-by-case ap-
104 Id. at 683-84.
105 This statement presumes that remote purchasers readily can confirm the covenant's
completed performance. Ideally, this confirmation would come as an affidavit or other
recordable document so as to assure future title searchers of the covenant's satisfaction.
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proach, one can make a reasonable case for enforcing the covenant against
Z.
Consistent with this approach, some courts have upheld one-time resale
fees as reasonable and enforceable restraints on alienation.'06 In Kerley v.
Nu-West, Inc.,'" for example, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the en-
forcement of a resale fee identical to the above hypothetical (i.e., a one-time
resale fee), concluding that the covenant had a worthwhile purpose (allow-
ing the original purchaser to defer a portion of the full purchase price of the
land). 108 Likewise, in United States v. 397.51 Acres of Land,'" two sisters
conveyed their respective undivided one-third interests to their brother, the
third cotenant, by a deed that reserved for each sister the right to receive
one-third of any future condemnation award over $25,000.no Nearly twenty
years later, the land was condemned, and the sisters sought to enforce the
right to payment against the brother and his wife, collectively successors to
the brother's interest.'11 The Tenth Circuit upheld a judgment in favor of the
sisters, rejecting the view that the agreement constituted an invalid quarter
sale and holding that the agreement involved "no restraint" on alienation of
the land. 112
Nevertheless, other courts have struck down similar resale fees or
profit-sharing arrangements.' 13 Some explicitly have used the rhetoric of
106 See, e.g., United States v. 397.51 Acres of Land, 692 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1982);
Kerley v. Nu-West, Inc., 762 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Application of Mazzone, 22
N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1939) (discussing reservation of right to payment from future
condemnation award and holding that deed provision did not restrain alienation because
grantor had no control or restriction on full and free conveyance of the land to successive
owners; Whittemore v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 75 N.Y.S. 847 (App. Div. 1902); Bennet v.
Washington Cemetery, 11 N.Y.S. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (reservation of right to payment upon
resale of cemetery lots; held that deed provision was valid means of enabling buyer to pay
agreed purchase price of the cemetery).
'762 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
See id. at 635-36.
692 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1982).
110 See id at 690.
See id.
112 See id at 691-92.
113 See, e.g., Caulk v. Orange County, 661 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Lafond v. Rumler, 574 N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Wiesenthal v. Young, 116
N.Y.S.2d 449 (App. Div. 1952). In another common fact pattern, donors have conveyed or
devised a fee simple estate but provided that if the grantee/devisee sold the land, the grantee
had to pay some or all of the proceeds to other family members. For example, in White v.
White, testator devised a home but stated that if the devisee sold the home within fifteen
years of the testator's death, two-thirds of the sale proceeds would be payable to the
devisee's brother and sister. 251 A.2d 470 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969). The court held the
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touch and concern, such as in Caulk v. Orange County,114 in which grantors
deeded land to Hibbard but required that any proceeds from condemnation
of a portion of the land would be payable to grantors."' 5 The Florida District
Court of Appeal held that the provision was a personal covenant that did not
touch and concern land.116 Other courts instead have struck down such ar-
rangements as violations of the rule against unreasonable restraints on alien-
ation. For example, in LaFond v. Rumler,117 a buyer that had agreed to pur-
chase land for $60,000 received a third-party offer to buy the land for
$80,000.'18 Because the seller needed immediate use of the buyer's down-
payment, seller and buyer modified their agreement such that (1) buyer
would purchase the land on an installment contract for $20,000 down and
payments of $400/month and (2) seller and buyer-for themselves and their
successors-would split the profit if the buyer resold during the ensuing
fifteen years. 119 In part because the agreement entitled the seller to reject a
proposed resale if the price was inadequate, the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed an order declaring the profit-sharing provision to be an unreasona-
ble restraint on alienation.' 20 Likewise, in Wiesenthal v. Young,t2' a deed
restricted any transfer by the buyer/grantee for a period of two years but
provided that seller/grantor could waive this restriction upon payment of
$1,000. When the grantor thereafter demanded this $1,000 payment for his
consent to the grantee's proposed sale, the grantee refused. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed a judgment in favor
of the grantor, citing DePeyster and holding that the provision constituted
an unreasonable restraint on alienation despite its limited two-year dura-
tion.123
restriction to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation because it would "discourage
improvements." Id at 474-75; accord Wieting v. Billinger, 3 N.Y.S. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1888);In
re Surovy's Will, 215 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sur. Ct. 1961); Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs, 132 S.E. 351
(Va. 1926).
114 661 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
115 See id at 933.
116 Id at 934.
117 574 N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Its See id at 41.
119 See id at 41-42.
120 See id at 45.
121 116 N.Y.S.2d 449 (App. Div. 1952).
122 See id at 450.
123 See id
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C. The Restatement of Servitudes
As explained in Part II.B, the touch and concern standard has a mixed
record as a check against unwarranted interference with the alienability of
land. Decisions like Caullett, Montgomery, and McKenna demonstrate that
the if-the-benefit-is-in-gross-the-burden-won't-run rule is an exceedingly
blunt tool.124 Applying the rule in a prophylactic fashion can negate cov-
enants that were a fundamental part of the parties' bargained-for considera-
tion and would have had at best a de minimis or temporary impact upon the
alienability of the affected land. Further, courts have not applied the rule
consistently, as reflected by the decisions involving rights of first refusal,
covenants not to compete, and tying arrangements.12 5 Finally, the theory
underlying the rule varies; while some courts continue to rely upon the rhe-
toric of touch and concern in evaluating covenants that create in gross bene-
fits,126 others assess whether such covenants constitute unreasonable re-
straints on alienation.127
For these reasons, the touch and concern standard attracted substantial
criticism in the drafting of the Third Restatement. In 2000, the American
Law Institute promulgated the Third Restatement in an attempt to "[t]reat[]
the law of easements, profits, and covenants as an integrated body of doc-
trine." 28 The Third Restatement overtly abandons the touch and concern
requirement, stating in section 3.2 that "[n]either the burden nor the benefit
of a covenant is required to touch or concern land in order for the covenant
to be valid as a servitude." 29 Adopting a strong freedom-of-contract ap-
proach to the creation of servitudes and their enforcement against succes-
sors, section 3.1 provides that a servitude is valid unless it is "illegal or un-
constitutional or violates public policy" 30-- effectively shifting the burden
124 See Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc. 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. App. Div. 1961);
Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Ct. Apt. 1929); Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc.
v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
125 See supra notes 50-80 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. d (2000) (discussing affirmative payment obligations and
tying arrangements, stating: "The touch-or-concern doctrine does not provide the means to
discriminate between those which should and should not be enforced, and leads to apparently
incom rehensible distinctions in cases and to invalidation of some legitimate servitudes.").
See, e.g., Caullett, 170 A.2d at 55.
127 See, e.g., Cole v. Peters, 3 S.W.3d 846, 850-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. ("It is designed to allow both
traditional and innovative land-development practices using servitudes without imposing
artificial constraints as to form or arbitrary limitations as to substance.").
129 Id § 3.2.
13 0 See id § 3.1.
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of establishing that a covenant is invalid to the party challenging it.131 Servi-
tudes that are invalid because they violate public policy include, but are not
limited to, those that (1) are arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious;
(2) unreasonably burden a fundamental constitutional right; (3) impose an
unreasonable restraint on alienation; (4) impose an unreasonable restraint
upon trade or competition; or (5) are unconscionable.' 32 While a servitude
that imposes a direct restraint on alienation is enforceable only if enforce-
ment is reasonable under the circumstances,133 a servitude that imposes only
an indirect restraint on alienation is enforceable as long as a rational justifi-
cation supports it.13
As with many law reform efforts, the Third Restatement has drawn both
great praise and trenchant criticism. Abandoning the touch and concern re-
quirement has not met with universal support. Commentators have long ar-
gued that retention of the touch and concern standard is justified as a check
on the creation of servitudes that have nothing to do with ownership or use
of land.'35 As discussed in Part m, the current debate over the enforceability
of private transfer fee covenants may provide an object lesson for this criti-
cal perspective.
I See id. § 3.1 cmt. a.
132 See id. § 3.1(1)-(5).
133 See id. § 3.4 ("A servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the
burdened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable. Reasonableness is determined by
weighing the utility of the restraint against the injurious consequences of enforcing the
restraint.").
13See id § 3.5:
An otherwise valid servitude is valid even if it indirectly restrains
alienation by limiting the use that can be made of property, by reducing
the amount realizable by the owner on sale or other transfer of the
property, or by otherwise reducing the value of the property. ... [But a]
servitude that lacks a rational justification is invalid.
See, e.g., Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1177, 1233 (1982) (touch and concern standard justified as promoting efficiency and
safeguarding individual freedom); Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of
Touch and Concern, 1988 DuKE L.J. 925, 945 (1998) (defending retention of touch and
concern standard because it establishes the "most efficient allocation of the covenant
between the prior holder of an interest in land and his successor"); A. Dan Tarlock, Touch
and Concern Is Dead Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REv. 804, 828-30 (1998)
(justifying retention of touch and concern standard based upon consumer protection theory
that would limit enforcement of covenants that served no objective purpose in land
planning).
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M. SHOULD COURTS ENFORCE PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE
COVENANTS UNDER THE THIRD RESTATEMENT?
Under the traditional if-the-benefit-is-in-gross-the-burden-won't-run
rule, a developer had little incentive to impose private transfer fee cov-
enants. Given their analytical similarity to quarter sales,136 courts were un-
likely to enforce such covenants against successors. In the wake of the
Third Restatement, however, the use of private transfer fee covenants has
accelerated.'37 The Third Restatement appears to have encouraged the
spread of such covenants by purporting to reject the traditional prophylactic
rule in favor of a reasonableness standard that presumes covenants are rea-
sonable. Indeed, companies marketing private transfer fee covenants charac-
terize such covenants as reasonable restraints within the meaning of the
Third Restatement.138
But is this view correct, or should the law view private transfer fee cov-
enants as contrary to public policy and an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion? This Part evaluates transfer fee covenants under the rules set forth in
the Third Restatement. It first briefly addresses transfer fees payable to
HOAsl 39 and then turns to private transfer fee covenants.'
A. Transfer Fees Payable to HOAs
The most common example of transfer fees payable to HOAs is the
"flip tax" that cooperative documents frequently impose upon transfers of a
cooperative apartment. To date, courts have upheld the ability of coopera-
tive associations to collect transfer fees created by the cooperative's govern-
ing documents, whether the fees are structured as a fixed dollar fee,141 a per
share fee,142 or a fee based on a percentage of net profit on resale.143 An il-
136 See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
137 See Freehold Brochure, supra note 8.
138 The promotional material of Freehold Capital Partners specifically points to the
Third Restatement as support for the enforceability of its covenant device. See Freehold
Brochure, supra note 7, at 10.
See infra Part M.A.
14See infra Part lH.B.
141 See Jamil v. Southridge Coop. Section No. 4 Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 905, 905 (App.
Term 1979) ($2,000); see also Beachwood Villas Condo. v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1144
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding $25 processing fee on approved rentals of
condominium units).
142 See Zuckerman v. 33072 Owners Corp., 468 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 1983)
($2 fee per share for approval of subletting of proprietary lease).
See Badowski v. Roosevelt Terrace Coop., Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 1989)
(25% of net resale profit); Mogulescu v. 255 West 98th St. Owners Corp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 801,
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lustrative example is Mayerson v. 3701 Tenants Corp.,'44 in which the court
upheld the validity of a 7.5% transfer fee and held that the transfer fee's
purposes of raising revenues needed for the cooperative's operations and
discouraging speculation were legitimate.14 5 Notably, the Mayerson court
did not discuss whether the amount of the fee was proportionally appropri-
ate, either to the transaction costs experienced by the association due to the
transfer, or relative to the incentive to flip units.' The Mayerson court also
rejected an argument that the fee unreasonably discriminated against recent
purchasers as compared to long-term residents.147
Under the Third Restatement, transfer fee covenants payable to HOAs
should be enforceable. Each of the plausible purposes for the fee cov-
enant-funding the association's costs of investigating and approving pur-
chasers, promoting stability within the building, and financing the mainte-
nance of common facilities-provides a rational justification within the
meaning of section 3.5(2). 148 Indeed, in the official comments to section 3.5,
illustration 5 explicitly acknowledges the validity of such community trans-
fer fee covenants.14 9
B. Private Transfer Fee Covenants
1. The Nominal Case for the Private Transfer Fee
As discussed in Part I, the private transfer fee covenant imposes a fee
that is payable to private parties and thus does not finance ongoing commu-
802 (App. Div. 1988) (15% of net resale profit, declining over time to 5%); Mayerson v.
3701 Tenants Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (7.5% of sale proceeds); De
Mello v. 79th St. Tenants Corp., 517 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (10% of net resale
profit)
1473 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1984).
145 See id at 124.
14 See id. at 125.
147 See id. ("The transfer fee is equally applicable to all sales, based on the actual sales
price.. . . That plaintiff may or may not clear a profit on resale does not render the fee
unreasonable.").
148 See supra Part I.A. Conceivably, a particular fee covenant might provide for a fee
that was so confiscatory in nature that a court might view it as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. For example, a declaration that imposed a fee of 50% of the gross sale price
effectively would operate, in practical terms, as an absolute restraint on alienation.
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5, cmt. c, illus. 5 (2000).
The declaration for a condominium development requires payment of
a transfer fee to the property-owners association on each transfer of a unit
by sale or lease. The amount of the fee is set by the governing board of
the association and the funds are used for operating expenses of the
association. There is a rational justification for the servitude.
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nity services or maintenance. As discussed earlier, under the traditional
touch and concern standard, the private transfer fee covenant created an in
gross benefit; therefore, its burden could not be enforced against succes-
sors.150 But under the rules set forth in the Third Restatement, the enforcea-
bility of the private transfer fee covenant is a bit murkier. The Third Re-
statement provides that "[a]n otherwise valid servitude is valid even if it
indirectly restrains alienation .. . by reducing the amount realizable by the
owner on sale or other transfer of the property, or by otherwise reducing the
value of the property" but "[a] servitude that lacks a rational justification is
invalid."' 5 1 In other words, under the Third Restatement, a rational justifica-
tion can overcome the fact that an indirect restraint reduces the value of the
land.
Marketers of transfer fee covenants defend them as a reasonable re-
straint on alienation.152 They argue that a 1% private transfer fee covenant
imposes no practical burden upon the alienability of land. They also argue
that, as long as the covenant is of record, a buyer of an affected lot can re-
duce its offer price to account for the transfer fee obligation that the buyer
will incur upon resale. Under this view, the private transfer fee covenant
does not diminish the alienability of the land and only slightly reduces the
price at which a transfer will take place.153
Further, developers make a plausible case-or at least a case that at first
blush sounds plausible-that a 1% private transfer fee covenant has a ra-
tional justification because it provides a mutual benefit to both parties, thus
facilitating residential development and home ownership. The covenant
benefits the developer by allowing the developer to retain transfer fee rights,
which facilitate the developer's marketing efforts. The covenant permits the
developer to sell its lots at a discounted price relative to comparable unre-
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
151 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 (2000).
152 See, e.g., Freehold Brochure, supra note 8, at 10 (suggesting that Freehold's
covenant satisfies the Third Restatement).
153 See id. (arguing that "[t]he mere obligation to pay money will generally not suffice
to unreasonably restrain alienation because the sales price will adjust to account for the
restraint"). For some, such as Richard Epstein, this statement properly ends the analysis; in
his view, because notice permits the buyer to adjust, the law should place no legal limits on
the ability of parties to attach promises to land as servitudes beyond those inherent in the
operation of a recording statute. See Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1368 (1982). Nevertheless, the Third
Restatement requires that an indirect restraint must still have a rational justification because,
as Jeff Stake has observed, Epstein's account "takes insufficient account of the fact that
people do stupid things" and thereby "reduce the well-being of society." Stake, supra note
118, at 934.
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stricted land in exchange for the delayed economic benefit of receiving fu-
ture transfer fees.
The covenant also theoretically benefits the buyer; while the covenant
will reduce the amount the buyer will collect upon resale, it should also re-
duce the buyer's acquisition cost relative to the acquisition cost for compa-
rable unrestricted land. Reducing the buyer's acquisition cost may produce
collateral savings in the buyer's carrying and transaction costs. The lower
purchase price means the buyer presumably is borrowing less to finance the
purchase, thus reducing the buyer's interest costs. Likewise, the premiums
for the buyer's title insurance-and for the mortgagee's loan policy, which
the buyer typically pays-will be marginally lower. The reduction in the
land's value should also marginally reduce the buyer's ad valorem real es-
tate tax obligations. Finally, if the buyer later resells the land using a broker,
the broker's commission should be slightly lower as the covenant will pro-
duce a lower selling price relative to comparable unrestricted land.' 54
Based on this narrative, some courts might be reluctant to invalidate a
transfer fee covenant as lacking a rational justification. Indeed, the Third
Restatement's freedom-of-contract rhetoric is sweeping:
Many economic arrangements for spreading the
purchase price of property over time and for allocating risk
and sharing profit from property development can be
attacked as indirect restraints on alienation. If such
arrangements are not unconscionable and do not otherwise
violate public policy, there is usually no reason to deny the
parties freedom of contract. The parties are usually in a
better position than judges to decide the economic trade-
offs that will enable a transaction to go forward and
enhance their overall value. The fact that the value that
may be realized from a parcel of land that is part of a larger
arrangement has been reduced does not justify legal
intervention to nullify part or all of the agreed-on
arrangement.
.. . [I]ndirect restraints may have no overall negative
effects on the wealth of a society overall or more narrowly,
on the value of its land resources. On the contrary, they
may result in an overall increase in wealth. Therefore,
154 See Freehold Brochure, supra note 8, at 3 ("A buyer can buy for less in return for
paying the future fee. A buyer also saves on closing costs, carrying costs, interest expense,
etc., and can potentially use the initial savings to reduce credit card debt, consumer loans,
etc.").
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[section 3.5] adopts the position that a servitude is not
invalid simply because it reduces the value of a particular
piece of land or reduces the amount the owner will realize
on sale of the land. Unlike direct restraints ... courts
should not attempt to weigh the harm caused by an indirect
restraint against the overall value of the transaction in
which the servitude played a part. There are too many
potential variables, and private decisionmaking is more
likely than judicial decisionmaking to increase overall
wealth and well-being.
The comments continue with the sweeping statement that "[s]ervitudes
created in commercial transactions seldom lack rational justification."l 56
The comments to section 3.5 also recognize, however, that "[tihe fact
that there may be a rational justification for the obligation is not sufficient;
there must be a rational justification for imposing the obligation as a servi-
tude that runs with the land."' 5 ' This statement acknowledges that the servi-
tude must create some benefit that counterbalances the negative impact en-
forcing the servitude will have upon the value of the burdened land. 158 But
with the abandonment of the touch and concern standard, the benefit need
not be appurtenant to land. Thus, courts sympathetic to the freedom-of-
contract rhetoric in the above-quoted comments may hesitate to undo this
bargain by invalidating a transfer fee covenant as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation.
Indeed, the comments to the Third Restatement equivocate on whether a
transfer fee covenant creates an unreasonable restraint on alienation in vi-
olation of sections 3.1(3) and 3.5. The comments to section 3.5 validate
transfer fee covenants payable to an HOA to defray community operating
costs and to a charitable foundation to defray the expenses of maintaining
land subject to a conservation servitude.15 9 Nowhere do the comments state
that a private transfer fee covenant lacks a rational justification, although
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000).
156 Id cmt. b.
157 Id cmt. a.
158 See id. ("If there is no rational justification for the servitude, it should not be
enforced because there is no real trade-off for the resulting decrease in the value of the land,
and the legal system should not be used to enforce irrational arrangements against unwilling
participants.").
See id cmt. c, illus. 5 (payment of transfer fee to HOA); cmt. c., illus. 7 (payment of
transfer fee to maintain conserved land).
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the drafters easily could have included such an illustration.' 1Furthermore,
illustrations in other comments may create an implication that exacerbates
this uncertainty. For example, section 7.12 provides that affirmative cov-
enants to pay money terminate after a reasonable time if the instrument
creating the covenant does not specify the total sum due or a definite termi-
nation date.16' The comments then apply this provision to a private transfer
fee covenant:
Developer imposes a covenant on all lots in the Green
Acres subdivision requiring payment of one percent of the
sale price on each transfer of a fee simple and one percent
of the value of leases for 10 years or longer to Developer,
its successors or assigns. The covenant does not specify a
total sum due or a termination point. If the covenant is
valid under the rules stated in Chapter 3, it terminates after
a reasonable time has passed.16 2
Read in isolation, this phrasing leaves open the possibility that a ration-
al justification could support a private transfer fee covenant within the
meaning of section 3.5.
2. Private Transfer Fee Covenants and Sound Land Policy
Notwithstanding the ostensible justifications that advocates of private
transfer fee covenants offer, enforcing such covenants constitutes unsound
public policy. For several important reasons, discussed in turn below, courts
should refuse to enforce these covenants against successors.
a. Buyers Cannot Accurately Price the Effect of a Private
Transfer Fee Covenant
The argument that a private transfer fee covenant is a reasonable re-
straint on alienation depends upon a dubious assumption: that a buyer can
correctly evaluate the covenant's implications and adjust his offer price to
160 As discussed below, rather than attack private transfer fee covenants as lacking a
rational justification, the Third Restatement takes the view that private transferfee covenants
are unconscionable in most circumstances. See infra notes 168-69.
161 See id. § 7.12. On its face, this section would not invalidate the Freehold private
transfer fee covenant, which is by its express terms is limited to ninety-nine years in
duration.
162 Id cmt. b, illus. 1 (emphasis added).
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account for its effect.163 But even if most buyers know a private transfer fee
covenant exists, they cannot price its effect with precision.
First, the amount of a buyer's future transfer fee obligation is a function
of the land's value at a future date. Both the expected future appreciation in
the land's value and the appropriate discount rate-the rate used to convert
the expected future transfer fee obligation into present dollars-must be
taken into account. Even if we assume the buyer knows she will resell and
thus incur a transfer fee in five years' time, little or no empirical data exists
to support the proposition that the average homebuyer can make an in-
formed or accurate judgment about future rates of land appreciation or dis-
count rates. Anecdotally, the current mortgage crisis, in which millions of
borrowers incurred excessive mortgage debts on the assumption that land
values would continue to appreciate, raises substantial doubt about the aver-
age homebuyer's capacity to predict future land values.
Second, most buyers do not know how long they will own their homes,
and they need this information to price the covenant's effect accurately. As-
sume that X is looking to buy a home that would have a $250,000 value if
unrestricted but that is subject to a 1% private transfer fee covenant. If X
plans to sell the house in two years, X can readily appreciate the need to
discount the offer price to account for the fact that X expects to incur a
transfer fee of around $2,500 (give or take a few dollars to account for any
appreciation or depreciation in value) in two years' time. By contrast, if X
expects to live in the house for forty years (for example, until X retires or
dies), X may reasonably conclude that the covenant's effect in present dol-
lars is de minimis and discount X' s offer price by a much smaller amount.164
163 As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have explained, one reason why courts
traditionally limited property rights to standardized forms (the numerus clausus principle)
was that standardization reduced information processing costs:
When property rights are created, third parties must expend time and
resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating
them and to acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual
property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property
rights. Those creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot
always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs fully into
account, making them a true externality. Standardization of property rights
reduces these measurement costs.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law ofProperty: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
164 Suppose that X bought land in 2000 for a price of $250,000 and expected not to sell
it until X's expected retirement in 2040, at which time X expected to sell it for $500,000 due
to anticipated appreciation. X would expect to incur a $5,000 transfer fee in 2040, but the
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But typical buyers have no idea whether they will live in their home for two
years or fifty years, and thus cannot accurately judge the appropriate
amount by which to discount the offer price.
Third, in most real estate negotiations, buyers lack a way to evaluate the
cost savings that advocates cite to justify the enforcement of private transfer
fee covenants. If a transfer fee covenant enables X to acquire Blueacre for
$2,500 less-and thus to borrow $2,500 less to acquire Blueacre-X will
save $100-$120 in interest costs during the first year and slightly less during
each subsequent year as the principal balance amortizes. But X cannot know
for certain that X is saving $100-$120 per year in interest costs unless X also
knows X is paying $2,500 less to acquire the land due to the presence of the
covenant. Unfortunately, X cannot be confident of this unless the developer
offers X the choice of buying the land at either a restricted price (subject to
the covenant) or an unrestricted price (not subject to the covenant). If the
developer presents the covenant to X on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, X does
not have a meaningful covenant or no covenant choice. Further, because
land is relatively unique, a buyer cannot easily identify an identical or even
similar unrestricted parcel to use as a baseline to calculate the incremental
burden and benefit of the covenant.
On the whole, buyers are likely to underestimate the covenant's effect
and, thus, are unlikely to discount their offer prices sufficiently.165 To the
extent this is true, private transfer fee covenants effectively operate as an
arbitrage opportunity for the developer. Not surprisingly, the promotional
materials used by Freehold to market its transfer fee covenant documenta-
tion tout this opportunity. Freehold's brochure suggests that a 1% transfer
present value of that fee in year-2000 dollars would be only about $486, assuminga discount
rate of 6%.
165 People frequently make decisions using mental shortcuts or biases that make
transactions and decisions easier, but this type of decision making can lead to erroneous
judgments. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). One such shortcut is a bias toward
optimism: during decision making, people may tend to overestimate the likelihood of
favorable future events (for example, a buyer may assume that he will live in the house for
longer than is likely). See Anat Bracha & Donald J. Brown, Affective Decision Making: A
Theory of Optimism Bias, in COwLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS (YALE
UNIV. 2010). Another such bias is the ambiguity effect, which may cause a buyer to ignore
the impact of information that the buyer does not have or that is too difficult for the buyer to
process. In addition, the effect heuristic might cause a buyer to ignore or discount certain
information (for example, the economic impact of a transfer fee covenant) based upon the
buyer's positive affect toward the potential house purchase (for example, "I really love that
kitchen.").
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fee covenant should reduce the buyer's offer price by approximately 2%.166
At the same time, earlier versions of Freehold's brochure estimated the
present value of the future stream of transfer fee payments at approximately
5% of the improved value of the property. If buyers truly were informed and
sufficiently sophisticated to price the covenant accurately, such a sizable
gap should not be present.
In fairness to Professor Susan French, the reporter for the Third Re-
statement, she likewise doubted the ability of most residential purchasers to
price a private transfer fee covenant accurately.167 The Third Restatement
addresses the problem not through section 3.5-in other words, not as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation-but through section 3.7, which pro-
vides that "[a] servitude is invalid if it is unconscionable."168 Illustration 3
in the commentary to section 3.7 suggests that a court should treat a private
transfer fee covenant as unconscionable:
The declaration of covenants for Greenacres, a
residential subdivision, includes a provision obligating the
owner of each lot to pay the developer, or its assigns, a
royalty of one percent of the gross sales price on each
resale of each lot in the subdivision in perpetuity. In the
absence of unusual circumstances, the conclusion would be
justified that the provision is unconscionable.' 69
While I agree that private transfer fee covenants should not be enforce-
able, I doubt the conclusion in the quoted illustration is descriptively cor-
rect, at least based upon existing unconscionability doctrine. First, no re-
ported cases exist in which a court has invalidated a private transfer fee
covenant as unconscionable or consistently invalidated analogous covenants
as unconscionable. Second, considering existing case law on unconsciona-
166 See Freehold Brochure, supra note 8, at 3.
167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.7 cmt. c (2000)
"The fact that the performance called for by one party extends far into
the future and its value cannot be readily predicted at the time the
servitude is created is [a] factor that may lead to the conclusion that a
servitude is unconscionable.. . . The average buyer may not appreciate
the long-term significance of the servitude arrangements because the
physical characteristics of the housing and the quality of the
neighborhood are likely to occupy the forefront of the buyer's attention."
Id.
168Id. § 3.7.
69Id. cmt. c, illus. 3.
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bility, courts likely will not consistently strike down private transfer fee
covenants as unconscionable.
A court will invalidate a contract as unconscionable only if the contract
is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.17 0 Procedural un-
conscionability focuses upon the relative bargaining power between the par-
ties and the extent to which the contract clearly discloses its terms. A buyer
seeking to avoid the enforcement of a private transfer fee covenant may ar-
gue that the covenant is the product of adhesion and thus procedurally un-
conscionable. Some authority to this effect is present in California judicial
decisions invalidating mandatory consumer arbitration agreements as pro-
cedurally unconscionable if the drafter offered them on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. 17 1 Nothing about a transfer fee covenant is inherently procedurally
unconscionable, however, particularly if the covenant is recorded and ap-
pears in text no smaller than any other covenants affecting the land.172 Fur-
ther, even if a developer refuses to negotiate over the inclusion or terms of a
private transfer fee covenant, this situation is not analogous to mandatory
consumer arbitration or other adhesion clauses in standard-form consumer
contracting. Prospective buyers of real estate subject to private transfer fee
covenants have a large supply of alternative parcels that are not subject to
such covenants; therefore, a buyer that purchases land subject to such a cov-
enant cannot meaningfully argue "I had no choice." As a result, courts like-
170 WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE & WILLIAM H. HENNING, UNDERSTANDING SALES AND
LEASES OF GOODS 113 (1999). Courts have recognized something of a sliding scale in
making this determination. While courts require both substantive and procedural
unconscionability, as the substantive oppression reflected in the agreement increases, the
amount of procedural unconscionability needed to invalidate the agreement decreases. See
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1284 (9th Cir. 2006); JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW § 5-7, at 273-275 (2009).
171 See id. at 1284 (arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable, even if only
minimally so, where one party "had overwhelming bargaining power, drafted the contract,
and presented it to [the other party] on a take-it-or-leave-it basis"); see also Aral v.
EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding "quintessential
procedural unconscionability" where "the terms of the [arbitration] agreement were
presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis . . . with no opportunity to opt out"); Flores v.
Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (Ct. App. 2001) (standards for
procedural unconscionability are satisfied by finding that arbitration provision was presented
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and was oppressive due to "an inequality of bargaining power
that result[ed] in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice").
172 See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998)
(holding arbitration clause in Gateway sales contract was spelled out with sufficient clarity to
preclude finding of procedural unconscionability).
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ly will not consistently characterize private transfer fee covenants as proce-
durally unconscionable.
Even if one assumes that a private transfer fee covenant is procedurally
unconscionable, a court is unlikely to strike down the covenant unless the
covenant is also substantively unconscionable. A covenant is considered
substantively unconscionable if the terms of the agreement are "so one-
sided as to shock the conscience"1 73 or the bargain was "such as no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other."1 74 The Third Restatement
clearly views the private transfer fee as unconscionable based upon its cu-
mulative effect: "Even if the burden on any single owner of the burdened
land is not unduly harsh, the cumulative effect of a requirement for perpet-
ual payments by all future owners may be regarded as oppressive."17 5
Again, however, case law on unconscionability does not indicate that
courts will systematically invalidate private transfer fees as unconscionable.
Courts tend to apply unconscionability on an ad hoc basis, evaluating the
formation of the particular agreement, the terms of the agreement, and the
relative bargaining power and sophistication of the parties. Thus, one would
expect unconscionability to produce mixed results: courts might enforce
some fee covenants, but not others, depending upon the size of the fee, how
conspicuously the covenant appears in the document, and the sophistication
level of the buyer. Further, unconscionability is also unlikely to produce
consistent results because judges substantially differ in their philosophical
disposition toward freedom of contract. Instead, sound land policy and
equitable treatment of homebuyers requires the consistent nonenforcement
of private transfer fee covenants.
b. Private Transfer Fee Covenants Substantially and
Unjustifiably Impair the Alienability of Affected Land
Private transfer fee covenants have a significant potential to impede fu-
ture land transactions by imposing additional and unwarranted transaction
costs. Taken collectively, these costs, which could take a variety of different
forms highlighted below, might exceed any ostensible savings in transaction
and carrying costs touted by advocates of private transfer fees.17 6
173 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
174 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.7 cmt. a (2000).
175 Id cmt. c.
176 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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(1) Investigation and escrow costs. Developers sometimes sell their
right to collect future transfer fees. If the developer has sold the transfer fee
rights, a seller required to pay a transfer fee may incur expenses to locate
and pay the holder of the transfer fee rights. If the seller cannot find the
holder, the seller may be unable to close without agreeing to escrow the
transfer fee-to address satisfactorily the risk of a potential lien for unpaid
transfer fees-until the seller can locate the holder.17 7
(2) Negotiation and compliance costs. Most private transfer fee cov-
enants nominally obligate the seller to pay the transfer fee, but the seller
actually does not bear the effective cost of the fee. As in most real estate
transactions, the parties negotiate a price that effectively apportions the var-
ious closing costs or not-yet-payable real estate taxes. A private transfer fee
covenant adds one more variable to that negotiation and potentially makes
the negotiation longer and more complex. In addition, the seller may incur
cost in determining whether the seller must disclose the presence of the cov-
enant and, if so, in making proper disclosure. 178
In addition, because most private transfer fee covenants purport to
create a lien to secure unpaid fees, a question arises: what are the relative
priorities of a lien to secure unpaid transfer fees and a mortgage taken and
recorded after the transfer fee covenant is recorded? Any mortgage lender
financing the purchase will expect to have a first priority lien. While the
lender can obtain some protection by directing payment of the transfer fee
177 In its transfer fee covenant documentation, Freehold attempts to ameliorate this risk
by designating a trustee to collect transfer fees as they accrue. See Freehold Brochure, supra
note 8, at 5, 11, & 15. The trustee keeps track of the holder of the transfer fee rights over
time, and as fees are paid, disburses those fees to the then-holder of the rights. See id. In this
respect, one might characterize the trustee as a servicer of the transfer fee rights.
Theoretically, this structure ameliorates or moots the investigation cost problem byenabling
each seller to satisfy the transfer fee obligation by paying the trustee. Nevertheless, the
identity of the trustee could change over time, requiring the seller to incur the cost of
identifing the new trustee.
1 Traditionally, the seller did not have a duty to disclose title matters prior to
contracting but had a duty to deliver a marketable title at closing. See STOEBUCK &
WHitMAN, supra note 1, § 10.12, at 775. Although courts have required home sellers to
disclose material defects in the condition of the home that would not be discovered in a
reasonable inspection, see, e.g., Katherine A. Pancak, Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans,
Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further Demise of Caveat Emptor, 24 REAL EST. LJ. 291,
293 (1996), this duty does not appear to cover a title matter, which the seller could
presumably discover in a title search. Nevertheless, a broker representing the seller may
insist that the seller disclose the covenant, fearing that otherwise the buyer may use the
subsequent discovery of the covenant as a means to refuse to perform based upon title being
unmarketable. See supra note 10.
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from the loan proceeds, the lender may lack evidence of payment of transfer
fees that arose in prior sale transactions. Thus, the lender financing the pur-
chase of land that is subject to a private transfer fee covenant will likely
require the holder of the transfer fee covenant to subordinate its lien-
requiring the parties to incur the cost associated with negotiating, preparing,
and recording a subordination agreement. 179 Likewise, the buyer may incur
additional time and expense negotiating with the title insurer over the form
of the exception that the insurer will take for the presence of the covenant
and the risk that transfer fees from prior sale transactions remain unpaid.
(3) Multiple Transfer Fees? Finally, if private transfer fees are enforce-
able and reasonable in theory, nothing prevents an owner of land from im-
posing an additional transfer fee covenant benefitting that owner. A buyer
might see this as a way to recapture the cost of the initial transfer fee
through fees levied upon future resales. Such a "stacking" of transfer fee
covenants would result in the payment of multiple fees upon future resales.
This approach exacerbates the transaction costs described above and magni-
fies the covenant's practical effect upon the land's value and thus its future
alienability. 80
c. Private Transfer Fee Covenants Reduce the Tax Base for
the Benefit of Private Parties
Finally, and most importantly, the financial benefit that a private trans-
fer fee covenant creates for the developer comes at the public's expense. To
the extent that a private transfer fee covenant is enforceable against succes-
sors, it reduces the value of the affected land. This reduction artificially de-
creases the ad valorem tax base of the broader public community of which
179 Freehold's transfer fee covenant documentation mitigates the lien priority problem
by expressly subordinating its lien to the lien of a lender financing the purchase. See
Freehold Brochure, supra note 8, at 15. This approach negates the need to obtain a
subordination agreement from the trustee when financing or refinancing the purchase of an
affected home. Nevertheless, the presence of the transfer fee covenant and the lien to secure
unpaid fees still could violate the provisions of a mortgage or security agreement, which
would necessitate the expense of obtaining the necessary consents.
180 Freehold's transfer fee documentation purports to address this concern by
prohibiting the stacking of transfer fees. See id. ("Our Instrument prohibits stacking of
multiple fees."). But such a restriction constrains the ability of future owners to alienate their
interest as they see fit. Accordingly, the enforceability of a "no-stacking" provision is not
self-evident. If developers can sell land and impose a 1% private transfer fee covenant, how
can the developer legally impose an absolute prohibition on the buyer's ability to do the
same thing? Why wouldn't such a prohibition constitute an unreasonable restraint upon the
buyer's right of alienation?
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the affected land is a part. 81 Incremental sums that would have funded pub-
lic goods in the local community-such as public education, policing, fire
protection, streets, sewers, and other community services-instead are di-
verted into the pockets of private developers. Furthermore, this situation
happens not by a public vote, but by private contract. Sound public policy
cannot and should not permit private action, taken outside the community's
democratic processes, to divert the tax base for private benefit.
As the use of private transfer fee covenants has grown, more organized
efforts have begun to restrain the further spread of this practice. In October
2009, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (JEBURPA)
unanimously resolved that private transfer fee covenants are contrary to
public policy and constitute an unreasonable restraint on the alienability of
land.18 Likewise, both the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and the
American Land Title Association (ALTA) have adopted policy statements
against the use and enforcement of private transfer fee covenants.", Most
181 Theoretically, the municipality could account for this reduction by treating the
transfer fee right itself as a taxable interest in real property and taxing that interest. Doing so,
however, presents some profound practical obstacles. The existing real estate tax system is
parcel-based, and because the value of a transfer fee right is typically a percentage of the
value of the underlying parcel, the municipality would have to value a developer's transfer
fee rights on a parcel-by-parcel basis. However, the amount of the tax on such a small
fractional share may not be worth the additional record keeping expense for the tax collector.
Further, would the tax on the transfer fee right be payable each year (i.e., based upon the
assessed value of the transfer fee right) or only as parties sell property and pay fees? Because
of these practical concerns, the municipal ad valorem tax system likely would not capture the
appro riate portion of transfer fee rights.
JEBURPA serves as a consultative group to advise the Uniform Law Commission
regarding potential subjects for uniform laws pertaining to real estate. JEBURPA is
comprised of representatives from the Uniform Law Commission; the ABA's Real Property,
Trust and Estate Law Section; the American College of Real Estate Lawyers; and liaison
members from the American College of Mortgage Attorneys and the Community
Associations Institute. In April 2010, JEBURPA approved and issued a position paper
expressing the view that state courts should not enforce private transfer fee covenants and
state legislatures should enact statutes expressly prohibiting their enforcement. Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, Position Paper on Private Transfer Fee
Covenants (April 2010), www.law.missouri.edu/freyermuth/JEBURPA/JEBpositionpaper
privatetransferfeecovenants.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2010).
13 ALTA's statement provides that "[t]hese covenants provide no benefit to consumers
or the public, but rather cost consumers money, complicate the safe, efficient and legal
transfer of real estate, and depress home prices." American Land Title Association, Private
Transfer Fee Covenants, www.alta.org/advocacy/docs/PrivateTransferFeeCovenantOne
Pager.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2010). The NAR's statement argues that "such fees decrease
affordability, serve no public purpose, and provide no benefit to property purchasers, or the
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recently, in August 2010, the Federal Housing Finance Agency issued pro-
posed guidance that would (if adopted) restrict Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac from purchasing mortgages secured by land affected by a private trans-
fer fee covenant.'8
IV. REINSTITUTING A PROPHYLACTIC RULE
Ideally, our land system should provide grantors with the flexibility to
structure land transactions as they see fit, provided such transactions are not
contrary to public policy and do not create unreasonable restraints upon
alienability. As explained in Part m, sound land policy justifies a conclu-
sion that private transfer fee covenants are contrary to public policy and
should not run with the land as servitudes. The question of how best to
reach this conclusion in our current legal system remains.
As the old saying goes, there is more than one way to skin a cat. The
traditional touch and concern standard reflected the common law's cautious,
over-restrictive approach to regulating land transactions. The common law
recognized a limited set of permissible rights and, under the numerus clau-
sus principle, brooked little creativity.'85 Restrictive common law rules,
such as RAP and the touch and concern standard, placed prophylactic if
perhaps overbroad limits upon the creativity of owners so as to protect the
alienability of land in a broad sense. It was thought better, under this ap-
proach, for courts to be overprotective of alienability. Where this approach
proved unsatisfactory-where it invalidated a benign practice, a wealth-
maximizing practice, or both-legislatures stepped in and adjusted the sys-
community in which the property is located." National Association of Realtors, Private
Transfer Fees-Issue Summary, http//www.realtor.org/politicaladvocacy (follow "private
transfer fees" link) (last visited Aug. 4, 2010).
194 Proposed Guidance on Private Transfer Fee Covenants, Federal Housing Finance
Agency (No. 2010-N-1 1), 75 Fed. Reg. 49932. Unfortunately, the proposed guidance failed
to distinguish between private transfer fees and transfer fees payable to HOAs; under the
proposed guidance, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be unable to purchase any mortgage
secured by land affected by a transfer fee covenant benefiting an HOA. Because state law
has traditionally treated such fees as enforceable, see supra notes 141-49, the proposed
guidance was widely perceived as overreaching. Furthermore, because the proposed
guidance would apply retroactively, its implementation would immediately render
unmarketable the title of any landowner within an HOA benefited by a transfer fee covenant
(as the buyer of such a title would be unable to secure conventional mortgage financing).
Based upon such concerns, FHFA received over 2,600 comments, and as of the date of
publication of this article, FHFA has not yet issued official guidance.
185 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 9-24.
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tern by expressly authorizing the practice at issue.186 Examples include leg-
islative modification of RAP'87 and statutory authorization of both conser-
vation easements188 and environmental covenantsl8 9 (rights not recognized
under traditional common law rules).
The Third Restatement approached cat skinning differently. Rather than
relying upon the legislature as the system's corrective device, the Third Re-
statement threw aside the touch and concern principle, confident that courts
can and will strike the appropriate balance between the alienability of land
and flexibility and innovation in land transactions. The risk of this approach
is that it produces less certain results, at least in the short run; some prac-
tices that are not benign will sneak through the net until judicial consensus
arises or legislatures act to rein in those practices. The recent increase in the
use of private transfer fee covenants is a case in point. By rejecting the
touch and concern standard, the Third Restatement created uncertainty
about the enforceability of private transfer fee covenants and developers
have actively exploited that uncertainty.
Too much time will likely pass before judicial consensus on the en-
forceability of private transfer fee covenants develops,'" and the more time
186 See id at 58-60 (noting that nearly all changes in forms of property ownership in
English and American law have occurred through legislative action).
187 See STOEBUCK & WHIrrMAN, supra note 1, §§ 3.21, 3.22, at 132-38 (discussing
statutory RAP reforms such as the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, as well as
the abolition of RAP either generally or as applied to interests created in trust).
188 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT, 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
States adopting the UCEA statutorily validated conservation easements despite the common
law's traditional unwillingness to recognize new forms of negative easements. See id. at § 4
cmt. ("Because a far wider range of negative burdens than those recognized at common law
might be imposed by conservation or preservation easements, [UCEA § 4(4)] modifies the
common law by eliminating the defense that a conservation or preservation easement
imposes a 'novel' negative burden.").
189 See UNIF. ENVTL. COVENANTS Acr, 13 pt. 1 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 2010). An
environmental covenant facilitates the cleanup of contaminated land by specifying by
covenant that cleanup can occur to a level appropriate for a particular use rather than to the
level appropriate for unrestricted use. See UECA, Prefatory Note. Performance of cleanup
responsibilities pursuant to an environmental covenant would involve performance of
affirmative obligations on the covenantor, or its successor, and could benefit persons other
than the owner of the contaminated parcel or adjacent parcels. To encourage site-appropriate
remediation of contaminated sites, the UECA provides that an environmental covenant is
valid and enforceable even though it involves the performance of affirmative obligations and
without regard to whether it touches and concerns land. See id at § 5(b)(5)-(6).
190 As discussed in Part m, some courts may disagree over the proper standard for
evaluating a private transfer fee covenant (the traditional touch and concern rule or the Third
Restatement's approach). More significantly, the relatively small size of any one transfer fee
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that passes, the more land that developers can subject to private transfer fee
covenants. While Representative Maxine Waters has introduced a bill in
Congress that would ban the enforcement of private transfer fees, 191 action
on this bill is unlikely. Further, it is unclear whether Congress should ag-
gressively seek to displace the traditional role that states have played in reg-
ulating the enforcement of covenants running with land.
At this point, state legislatures should step in and enact prophylactic
rules providing that private transfer fee covenants are contrary to public pol-
icy and cannot run with title to land as servitudes. A number of state legisla-
tures have already done so. Florida adopted a statute invalidating private
transfer fee covenants in 2007,'92 and Missouri followed in 2008.1 Begin-
ning in 2009, an ad hoc task group comprised of representatives from
ALTA and the NAR prepared a model statute,'94 a copy of which appears in
the Appendix following this article. Since 2009, an additional fourteen
states-Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mar-
yland, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and
Utah 9 5-have adopted statutory provisions that are substantively compara-
ble to the ALTA/NAR model. Likewise, Texas has enacted a statute that, if
properly interpreted, should ban the enforcement of private transfer fee cov-
enants.19 6 Hopefully, legislatures in the remaining states will act prompt Z
during the 2010-2011 legislative session to adopt comparable legislation.
makes it less likely that any particular seller will invest the attorney fees necessary to bring
suit challenging the enforceability of the covenant. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra
note 163, at 58 ("For a variety of reasons, legislated changes in property forms produce
information to third parties at less cost than judicially mandated changes.").
191 See Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 11Ith Cong., 2d Sess.
The bill has been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services, but further action
on the bill is unlikely.
192 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28 (2007).
193 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.558 (2008).
194 See MODEL PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANT STATUTE (Am. Land Title Ass'n &
Nat'l Ass'n Realtors 2010), available at http//www.alta.org/advocacy/docs/PrivateTrans
ferFee ModelLaw.pdf.
193 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2000); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 319 (Westlaw 2010);
2009 Haw. H.B. 2288 (adopted June 22, 2010, official classification pending); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 155/1 to 155/15; IOWA CODE § 558.48 (2010); KAN. STAT. § 58-3821; LA.
REV. STAT. §§ 9:3131 to 9:3136; MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.] § 10-708 (2010); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 513.73 to 513.76 (2010); Miss. Laws 2010, ch. 348, § 1 (official classification
pending); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39A-1 to 39A-3; OHo REV. CODE § 5301.057 (Westlaw
20101 OR. REV. STAT. § 93.269 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-46 (2010).
The Texas statute prohibits the enforcement of a covenant imposing a transfer fee
upon a "transferee of residential real property or the transferee's heirs, successors, or assigns
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The model statute prepared by ALTA and NAR expresses state legisla-
tive findings that private transfer fee covenants violate public policy by
creating an unreasonable impediment to the alienability of land regardless
of the duration of the covenant or the amount of the transfer fee.198 The stat-
ute would prospectively invalidate any transfer fee covenant recorded after
the statute's effective date, and make such a covenant unenforceable against
the real property or any subsequent owner of the property.' The statute
would also invalidate any lien to the extent it purports to secure the payment
of a transfer fee.200
By its terms, the model statute would not apply to private transfer fee
covenants recorded prior to the statute's effective date. However, the statute
also provides that courts should not interpret it to validate such cov-
enants. 20 1 Thus, in any state adopting the model statute, a court facing a
challenge to a preexisting transfer fee covenant should evaluate the cov-
enant's enforceability based upon the common law of covenants and servi-
... in connection with a future transfer of the property." TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017(b)
(2007). Advocates of private transfer fees have argued that the Texas statute permits
enforcement as long as the covenant only obligates the transferor/seller to pay the fee. Texas
courts, however, should reject this argument. Even if a buyer/transferee is not legally
obligated to pay the fee that accrues when she buys the land, the covenant still imposes on
her the obligation to pay "a fee in connection with a future transfer of the property"-her
future resale. In addition, if the seller fails to pay the fee, it becomes a lien against the land
that effectively forces the buyer to pay the fee before the buyer can deliver clear title to a
subseuent purchaser.
At this point, California is the only state that has adopted a statute expressly
validating the imposition and enforcement of private transfer fee covenants. The California
Civil Code adopts a disclosure model, providing that a transfer fee covenant is enforceable
against successors as long as the person imposing the covenant records a document
indicating "Payment of Transfer Fee Required" in the chain of title to the real estate. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098.5 (2007). This document must contain certain mandated information,
including: (1) a clear statement of the amount or percentage of the fee; (2) for residential real
estate, "actual dollar-cost examples of the fee" for a home priced at $250,000, $500,000, and
$750,000; (3) the expiration date of the transfer fee covenant, if any; (4) the purpose for
which the funds from the fee will be used; and (5) the name of the entity to which the fee
must be paid (along with specific contact information). See id
198 See MODEL PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANT STATUTE § l(b)(2) (2010). In this
regard, the model statute reflects the desire to avoid the difficult line-drawing problems
highlighted by the court in DePeyster in striking down the quarter sale. See supra notes 91-
99 and accompanying text.
199 SmSee id § 1(c).200~ .See id.
21See id § 1(d).
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tudes. That court ought to conclude that such a covenant does not run with
the land to bind successors.202
The model statute recognizes that a covenant might impose a transfer
fee that is payable to an HOA for the purpose of financing association oper-
ations, maintenance of common amenities, or both. Such covenants would
typically satisfy the common law's touch and concern test,203 and thus the
statute excludes such covenants from the definition of a "transfer fee cov-
enant." 204 Likewise, in master planned communities, transfer fee covenants
on land within the various common interest communities that comprise the
larger development may finance some amenities such as community cen-
ters, recreational facilities, or performing arts centers. Because such facili-
ties provide an ostensible benefit to common interest communities and the
owners within these communities, covenants that create transfer fees to fund
those amenities are likewise excluded from coverage under the model stat-
ute.205
V. CONCLUSION
While advocates argue that private transfer fees are reasonable and
benefit buyers as well as developers, their arguments are unpersuasive.
Among the previously mentioned reasons for invalidating these fees, private
transfer fee covenants create an unjustified impediment to the transfer of
affected real estate; further, enforcing private transfer fee covenants-and
thereby lowering the value of the affected real estate-permits a developer
to divert a portion of the community's ad valorem tax base to the develop-
er's private benefit outside the community's democratic processes. As a
result, courts should refuse to enforce private transfer fee covenants against
successors, and any states that have not done so should enact legislation
consistent with the model statute discussed above and make clear that pri-
vate transfer fee covenants are contrary to public policy and void.
202 Model section 1(b)(1) makes a legislative finding that public policy favors the
alienability of land "free from covenants or servitudes that do not touch and concern" the
land. Id. § 1(b)(1). Absent an intervening statute or decision abolishing the touch and
concern standard, a court might interpret this finding as a legislative affirmation of the touch
and concern standard.
203 See supra notes 3, 141-45 and accompanying text.
MODEL PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANT STATUTE § 1(b)(1).
205 See id.
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APPENDIX
MODEL PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANT STATUTE
SECTION 1. Prohibition on Transfer Fee Covenants.
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Association" means a nonprofit, mandatory membership organi-
zation comprised of owners of homes, condominiums, cooperatives, manu-
factured homes, or any interest in real property, created pursuant to a decla-
ration, covenant, or other applicable law.
(2) "Transfer" means the sale, gift, grant, conveyance, assignment,
inheritance, or other transfer of an interest in real property located in this
State.
(3) "Transfer fee" means a fee or charge imposed by a transfer fee
covenant, but shall not include any tax, assessment, fee or charge imposed
by a governmental authority pursuant to applicable laws, ordinances, or
regulations.
(4) "Transfer fee covenant" means a provision ina document, wheth-
er recorded or not and however denominated, which purports to run with the
land or bind current owners or successors in title to specified real property
located in this State, and which obligates a transferee or transferor of all or
part of the property to pay a fee or charge to a third person upon transfer of
an interest in all or part of the property, or in consideration for permitting
any such transfer. The term "transfer fee covenant" shall not include:
(A) any provision of a purchase contract, option, mortgage, security
agreement, real property listing agreement, or other agreement which obli-
gates one party to the agreement to pay the other, as full or partial consider-
ation for the agreement or for a waiver of rights under the agreement, an
amount determined by the agreement, if that amount:
(i) is payable on a one-time basis only upon the next transfer of an
interest in the specified real property and, once paid, shall not bind succes-
sors in title to the property;
(ii) constitutes a loan assumption or similar fee charged by a lender
holding a lien on the property; or
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(iii) constitutes a fee or commission paid to a licensed real estate bro-
ker for brokerage services rendered in connection with the transfer of the
property for which the fee or commission is paid;
(B) any provision in a deed, memorandum, or other document record-
ed for the purpose of providing record notice of an agreement described in
subsection (a)(4)(A);
(C) any provision of a document requiring payment of a fee or charge
to an association to be used exclusively for purposes authorized in the doc-
ument, as long as no portion of the fee is required to be passed through to a
third party designated or identifiable by description in the document or
another document referenced therein; or
(D) any provision of a document requiring payment of a fee or charge
to an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, to be used exclusively to support cultural, educational,
charitable, recreational, environmental, conservation, or other similar activi-
ties benefiting the real property affected by the provision or the community
of which the property is a part.
(b) The Legislature makes the following findings:
(1) The public policy of this State favors the transferability of inter-
ests in real property free from unreasonable restraints on alienation and cov-
enants or servitudes that do not touch and concern the property.
(2) A transfer fee covenant violates this public policy by impairing
the marketability of title to the affected real property and constitutes an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation, regardless of the duration of the covenant
or the amount of the transfer fee set forth in the covenant.
(c) A transfer fee covenant recorded after the effective date of this sec-
tion, or any lien to the extent that it purports to secure the payment of a
transfer fee, is not binding on or enforceable against the affected real prop-
erty or any subsequent owner, purchaser, or mortgagee of any interest in the
property.
(d) Nothing in this section shall imply that a transfer fee covenant
recorded prior to the effective date of this section is valid or enforceable.
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